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THE MANAGEMENT-CONTROL
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
RELATIONSHIP: THREE MODELS
By ANDREW GOLDSMITH*
This Article seeks to contribute to the theoretical literature dealing with industrial
relations and labour law, in particular by addressing the management-control
collective bargaining relationship. The author identifies three distinct models
(Unitary, Pluralist, and Radical) which may be used to describe and analyze the
various facets of this relationship, drawing attention to the values and assumptions
of each position. In the instances of the Unitary and Pluralist models, an attempt
is made to illustrate the ways in which the models assume legal form, structuring,
facilitating and constraining collective bargaining in the workplace, while the
Radical model is presented as a necessary and powerful critique of the other two
models, pointing to the theoretical and practical limitations of these positions as
ways of understanding the significance of collective bargaining as a countervailing
force to management authority and control. Each model is discussed in the context
of both the public and private sectors.
I. INTRODUCTION
The principal utility of the relationship between management control
and collective bargaining models, or "frames of reference" as Alan Fox
would describe them,, lies in the fact that the adoption of a particular
model of management-labour relations determines:
1. one's perceptions of existing management-labour relations in the
workplace;
2. one's evaluation of the status quo in the workplace;
3. one's responses to the status quo when (if at all) it is sought
to change the balance of power in management-labour relations.2
@ Copyright, 1986, Andrew Goldsmith.
* This Article arises from work done towards the author's doctoral thesis, which was completed
in 1986 at the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. He would like to thank David Beatty, Harry
Glasbeek, and Kathy Swinton for reading and commenting on earlier drafts, and to the Law
Department, Brunel University for its various acts of assistance. Dr. Goldsmith has taught at Warwick
and Brunel in England, and has recently taken up a position in the Faculty of Law, Monash University,
Melbourne, Australia.
1 See U.K., Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations IndustrialSociology
and Industrial Relations, (Research Paper no. 3) by A. Fox (London: H.M.S.O., 1966) at 1.
2 Ibid
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A model has a normative and a descriptive significance. That is,
every model reflects a particular set of values and assumptions about
the proper extent and form of management control in the workplace,
as well as about the proper place and scope of collective bargaining,
but also provides an account of how management control and collective
bargaining operate in practice. The three models presented here are ideal-
types, signifying a generalization of viewpoints, and consequently do not
necessarily represent in their entirety the perspectives of those persons
and groups who would nonetheless fit within a particular model. In other
words, one cannot presume an exact homogeneity of views within each
model. Nor should it be assumed that there is no overlap between some
models.
A model provides not only a "way of viewing the world" of the
workplace, but may also serve as methods of self-assurance, instruments
of persuasion or techniques for trying to maintain or undermine legitimate
authority.3 Another way to view these models is as ideologies of
management control.
The three models presented here by taking fundamentally different
positions on most aspects of this relationship in both a descriptive and
a normative sense, provide another tool for analysing the relationship
between collective bargaining and management control. At a descriptive
level, a model allows us to examine the statements and actions of those
persons and groups involved in determining the form and content of
their relationship: collective agreements (representing the positions of
management and unions); arbitration decisions (representing the opinions
of third party arbitrators on matters affecting the scope of bargaining
and the interpretation of collective agreements); judicial decisions (re-
presenting the positions of the judiciary in reviewing labour relations
practices); and legislation (embodying the views of politicians and
bureaucrats); it should be possible empirically to establish which model,
or which aspect of a particular model, has exercised the greatest influence
in defining the nature of the relationship.
At the prescriptive level, for example, one model may exert more
influence upon certain parties to the collective bargaining management-
control relationship (for example, managers and arbitrators), while another
may point out issues which other models do not address, providing thereby
a source of challenges to conventional wisdoms and thus to the devel-
opment of theory.
3 Ibid at 5.
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Models also provide a predictive tool. If it is possible to discover,
for example, a judge's attitudes towards management and unions, then
a model enables a prediction to be made concerning that judge's likely
attitude towards collective bargaining, which can then serve as an aid
to interpretation or as a hypothesis for further investigation.
Models also provide a hierarchy of values with which to assess other
models and specific managerial and bargaining practices, and also provide
"principles of aggregation" whereby discrete events can be interpreted
as examples of more pervasive phenomena. In other words, models enable
the sorting out and "making sense" of data.
Finally, while "control" is plainly the product of more than mere
ideology, models also give some indication about the relative plausibility
of each position in terms of securing employee consent to management
control. An examination of the concerns of employees expressed in
collective agreements, arbitration, or litigation, combined with the cri-
tiques offered by the other models (where they exist), would seem to
provide a basis for this type of assessment.
A. Points of Departure
The models presented here are based upon three similar models
in the labour relations literature, generally referred to respectively as:
(1) Unitary; (2) Pluralist; and (3) Radical. This nomenclature is conve-
nient and shall be retained for present purposes. In order to outline the
principal features of each model, a number of questions can be asked
which are intended to illuminate the significance each model attaches
to the role of collective bargaining vis-ez-vis management control. These
questions are addressed to the various parties to the relationship, and
are framed to pursue in more concrete terms the general perspectives
addressed in a model or ("frame of reference") approach to analysis
which were mentioned earlier.
(1) First, concerning the view of the parties of the workplace
organization, is there an identity of interests and objectives shared by
members of the organization? If so, how far does it go and what are
these objectives? If a divergence of interests and objectives exists, are
these differences fundamental or minor? Is there perceived to be an
imbalance of bargaining power between management and employees?
4 See G. England, "Some Observations on Selected Strike Laws" in K. Swan & K. Swinton,
eds, Studies in Labour Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983); G. Schienstock, "Towards a Theory
of Industrial Relations" (1981) 19 Brit. J. Indus. Rel. 170; S. Hameed, "A Critique of Industrial
Relations Theory" (1982) 37 Relations Industrielles 15; A. Fox, supra, note 1; also A. Fox, Man
Mismanagement, 2d ed. (London: Hutchinson, 1985).
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(2) Second, what is the role of collective bargaining ascribed by
each model? In particular, what division of decision-making rights and
responsibilities, if any, is envisaged between management and employees?
How is this division determined? Are the allocations of decision making
to joint determination via collective bargaining substantial or marginal?
Each of the two foregoing areas for examination raises the issues
of the status of workplace hierarchy and the extent of the division of
labour in each model. Both strongly determine the type of organization
one is confronted with, and thus will clearly influence the interpretation
given to collective bargaining. Each model's position on these issues
therefore needs to be identified.
(3) Third, the role and function of trade unions under each model
should be addressed. The trade union role in the management of an
enterprise has been viewed alternatively as a needless interference, a
valid and necessary countervailing force, and as a managerial instrument
of co-optation. Standing as potentially alternative repositories of authority
and employee loyalty, and as representatives of collective employee power,
the significance of unions for management and collective bargaining is
indisputable. Each model's distinct position concerning their role therefore
needs to be considered.
The Unitary and Pluralist models illustrate the influence of each
model upon the values, assumptions and decisions of arbitrators, judges,
labour boards and also legislators. The characteristics of law and legal
institutions also reflect the development of the managerial ideologies
associated with the Unitary and Pluralist models. While some might wish
to assert that the Unitary model is now merely a matter of historical
interest, it still influences thinking about management and collective
bargaining issues. Pluralism is important as it would appear to be the
most influential contemporary perspective on these matters, and leaves
its unmistakable stamp upon the structure and jurisprudence of collective
bargaining. In contrast, while few if indeed any arbitrators, judges,
managers or even employees appear to subscribe openly to the Radical
view, nonetheless it provides a useful interpretation with which to analyse
the other models, and particularly Pluralism. In particular, it explicitly
invokes the dimensions of power, ideology and employee consent which
are important and insightful concepts for making sense of the
management-control collective bargaining relationship.
These three models may also be examined in terms of their
significance for both the public and private sectors. It would be possible
to equate the two sectors with respect to many aspects of the three models,
and it is now also widely conceded that public sector bargaining is more
[VOL 24 No. 4
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prevalent than private sector bargaining.5 Moreover, because public agency
managers have traditionally exhibited an even greater degree of resistance
to unionism and bargaining than their private sector counterparts 6 the
public sector presents an interesting field for the investigation of the
impact of collective bargaining on management control. Examination
of the Pluralist view of public sector management and collective bar-
gaining will necessitate, however, a separate consideration of legal aspects
because of the distinct development of collective labour law in the public
sector. Separate treatment of the public sector is also accorded under
the Unitary and Radical models to reflect the distinct approaches given
to it under these models.
II. THE UNITARY MODEL
A. A General View
1. A "community of interests"
The Unitary Model is without doubt the least sympathetic to the
presence of trade unions or collective bargaining in the workplace, which
are regarded as an interference in the efficient performance of the
managerial function and unnecessary for the protection of employee
interests. This is because there is perceived to be a "community of
interests"7 within the organization uniting management and employees.
Both are seen to be pursuing identical ends. The "team" and "family"
metaphors are frequently invoked in Unitary rhetoric, the vision being
one of employer and worker "pulling together."8 Employee loyalty is
stressed.9 Elton Mayo, Harvard industrial psychologist and founder of
the "Human Relations" approach to management, captured the essence
of this relation in the following statement. What should be striven for,
he stated, is "a balanced relation between various parts of the organisation,
so that the avowed purpose for which the whole exists may be conveniently
5 On the growth of public employee unionism in Canada, see R.M. Bird, "The Growth of
the Public Service in Canada" in D.K. Foot, ed., Public Employment and Compensation in Canada-
Myths and Realities (Scarborough: Butterworths, 1980); also A. Ponak, "Public Sector Collective
Bargaining" in J. Anderson & M. Gunderson, eds, Management-Union Relations (Toronto: Addison-
Wesly, 1982).
6 See D. Lewin, P. Feuille & T. Kochan, eds, Public Sector Labour Relations: Anatysis and
Readings (Glen Ridge, NJ.: Horton, 1977).
7 England, supra, note 4 at 224.
8 A. Fox, "Managerial Ideology and Labour Relations" (1966) 4 Brit. J. Indus. Rel. 366 at
367.
9 Ibid
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and continuously fulfilled.",o The "avowed purpose" envisaged in the
Unitary model, linking and coordinating management and the workforce
implicitly if not explicitly, is the maximum profitability and productivity
of the enterprise. To this end, all other objectives are required to be
subordinated."
B. One Source of Legitimate Authority
In order to achieve this objective, only one source of legitimate
workplace authority can be countenanced, which must extend to all aspects
of the enterprise, or at least to those aspects deemed by management
to be necessary for the successful pursuit of productivity and profitability.12
Several implications follow from this view. A hierarchy is inherent in
this view of workplace organization, as is a marked division of labour
between management and the workforce. Yet despite this hierarchy and
the division of labour, because of the "community of interest" between
management and workers, "[e]ach accepts his place and his function
gladly, following the leadership of the one so appointed.",1 Moreover,
because there is only one legitimate authority and management and
employees are linked by "shared objectives," there is virtually no room
for conflict in this model. Aside from the possibility of minor differences
arising over the exact distribution of financial rewards, conflict tends
to be viewed individualistically, and as deviant, stemming from some
atavistic employee pathology. AS Ralph Dahrendorf observed, for Unitary
theorists such as Mayo and Peter Drucker:
[C]lass conflict was but a relapse into barbarian conditions, an expression of human
imperfections, and it is necessary to render it impossible by the formation of "social
skills" i.e. the education of co-operative and peace-loving men ... class conflict
of capitalist society was a (almost psychological) phenomenon of "deviance" from
a normal state of integration and co-operation. Post-capitalist society tends toward
the "normal state," although a number of educational measures are still required
to bring it about.'4
10 Quoted in R. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1959) at 110.
1 Fox, supra, note 8 at 371. Philip Selznick has expressly addressed the tension inherent
in running an enterprise, between "getting the job done" (administration) and ensuring fairness
to all parties (adjudication). See P. Selznick, Law, Society and Industrial Justice (New York: Russell
Sage, 1969) at 16.
12 A. Fox, Beyond Contract Work; Power and Trust Relations (London: Faber, 1974) at 249.
For a discussion of the economic justifications for this principle, see P. Joseph, "Management's
Labour Relations Prerogatives and the Unproductive Debate" (1979) 14 U.B.C. L. Rev. 75.
13 Fox, supra, note 1 at 3.
14 Dahrendorf, Supra, note 10 at 11-12.
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In other words, on this view, organizational consensus and harmony is
seen as the normal state of affairs in organizations which, to be successful,
are directed and controlled by hierarchical organizational structures and
subject to a single legitimate authority.
C. The Trade Union Role
This attitude towards workplace conflict, not surprisingly, has in-
fluenced the Unitary perception of trade unions and collective bargaining.
The tendency for proponents of "Scientific Management",5 and "Human
Relations" theory to see the problems of conflict and workplace deviance
as remediable through greater managerial competence, more effective
leadership and improved communication, meant that the involvement
of unions in management affairs was generally not welcomed. If unions
served any valid role at all, which was extremely doubtful, it was as
bargaining agents for employees in the labour market. They did not belong
in the workplace.6 In almost every matter affecting the organization
and direction of the workplace, trade unionism and collective bargaining
constituted challenges to the notion of sovereign managerial authority
and were therefore unacceptable. While it might be acceptable for limited
consultation to occur between employee representatives and management,
having heard the employees' viewpoint, it was solely for management
to decide upon the best course of action.,7
D. Management Theory and the Unitary Model
These then are the principal characteristics of the Unitary model.
As will be seen shortly, assumptions concerning managerial sovereignty
have characterized to a considerable extent managerial and legal relations
in the public as well as the private sectors. However, because both the
managerial philosophies underlying the Unitary approach, the "Scientific
Management" and "Human Relations" approaches stress the importance
Is This is the school of managerial thinking associated with F.W. Taylor, Scientific Management
(New York: Harper, 1911). "Scientific Management" was a scheme whereby individual jobs were
to be simplified as far as possible, thereby minimizing the skill content of each position and enabling
ready substitution of workers. The conception of work was to be removed from the workers and
placed in the hands of management, this strengthening management's hold over the production
process. Another aspect was the development of time and motion analyses of production tasks
so as to rationalize and systematize workplace operations. This managerial approach is extensively
reviewed in H. Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review, 1974). For
a more brief discussion, see S. Hill, Competition and Control at Work (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press,
1981) at 24.
16 Fox, supra, note 8 at 371.
17 A. Flanders, Management and Unions: The Theory and Reform of Industrial Relations (London:
Faber, 1970) at 172.
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of a unified, hierarchical authority structure in the workplace, and have
attempted to rationalize managerial authority according to "scientific"
and "psychological" principles, they can be seen to amount to ideologies
justifying traditional superior-subordinate relations in the workplace and
the Unitary model generally.
It would be incorrect, however, to see these philosophies as favouring
some form of unfettered managerial authority. Rather each approach
represents the replacement of such unfettered workplace sovereignty with
some form of normative code, whether it be "scientific," "psychological"
or of some other derivation, and therefore in some sense effects a
curtailment of management discretion. Nonetheless, it must be clearly
stated that neither of these two approaches envisaged a substantial shift
in the balance of power between management and employees,,8 rather,
in the case particularly of the "Human Relations" approach, the ap-
peasement of some fairly trivial employee needs. An examination of these
philosophies does point also to the evolving nature of managerial
philosophies and practices. Reference therefore to the Unitary model
should not necessarily presume a static, non-innovative approach to
management-labour relations, nor one which simply seems to legitimate
the indiscriminate exercise of managerial authority.
Another significant managerial philosophy, which has left its mark
upon management-labour relations is the bureaucratic approach. While
it does not appear to have influenced industrial management until post-
1945,19 its historical origins reach back to the European civil service
bureaucracies of the nineteenth century and to the principles of military
organization developed in previous centuries.2o While it also stresses
unilateral managerial authority and absolute employee obedience to the
orders of superiors (and hence the centrality of hierarchy), the bureaucratic
approach is distinguishable from the "Scientific Management" and
"Human Relations" approaches in that it contemplates the governance
of the workplace by a set of promulgated written rules. Written rules
constrain flexibility of action by both management and employees, binding
both parties to a defined relationship, and provide another example of
how the Unitary model is not simply equatable with a managerial carte
blanche.
This approach also differs from the others in that, in contrast
particularly to "Scientific Management," it envisages each employee
18 See R. Bendix, Work and Authority in Industry (New York: Wiley, 1956) at 297.
19 See R. Edwards, Contested Terrain (New York: Basic Books, 1979) at 131.
20 See M. Janowitz, "Changing Patterns of Organizational Authority: The Military Establish-
ment" (1958-59) 3 Admin. Sci. Q. 473; The Professional Soldier (New York: Free Press, 1960)
at 26-27; and Fox, supra, note 8 at 367.
[VOL 24 No. 4
Management-Control Collective Bargaining Relationship
possessing a measure of discretion in performance of his work duties.
Compliance with written rules and other bureaucratic procedures replaces
the imposition of direct supervision as a means of achieving objectives.
In contrast to the "de-skilling" interpretation of "Scientific Manage-
ment,"21 wherein skilled occupations are seen as being increasingly
subdivided into substitutable and less costly forms of unskilled and semi-
skilled labour, thereby enhancing management's control of the work
process, the bureaucratic approach accords great trust to the employee
in recognition of his particular skills.22 Typically, the latter has been an
approach to control more commonly found in non-manual rather than
manual occupations.23
While three different managerial philosophies have been identified
here with the Unitary model, others perhaps could be added.24 The
influence of this model in labour law will now be considered. The value
of identifying these three approaches lies in recognizing the distinct
influences which comprise the Unitary model when they make themselves
apparent in legal contexts. As can be seen, each represents also a distinct
pro-management ideology with clearcut significance for management-
labour relations. It is probably the bureaucratic approach which is most
relevant for the analysis of labour law. Because it stresses a promulgated
code of rules, this raises questions about the authorship of the rules,
and about the substantive and procedural fairness of these rules. Bureau-
cratic management, in its traditional form, envisaged a hierarchical
formulation and application of rules effectively precluding employees
from participation on both counts. A summary and punitive method of
enforcing these rules also ensured that the hierarchy was preserved.
Moreover, because bureaucratic management was concerned with ef-
ficiency, the procedural and substantive "rights" of employees were
predominantly subordinated to the ends of the organization.25 It remains
now to see how far these bureaucratic values have been reflected in
the law governing management-labour relations.
21 See Braverman, supra, note 15.
22 For a discussion of high- and low-trust relationships in the workplace, see Fox, supra, note
12.
23 See Edwards, supra, note 19.
24 It has been argued by some that recent developments in "industrial democracy" projects
are, in reality, attempts to reformulate and legitimate a Unitary vision of workplace relations. See
D. Wilson et at, "The Limits of Trade Union Power in Organizational Decisionmaking" (1982)
20 Brit. J. Indus. Rel. 322 at 327. For a Canadian perspective on industrial democracy, see D.
Nightingale, Workplace Democracy: An Inquiry Into Employee Participation in Canadian Work
Organizations (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982).
" Edwards, supra, note 19.
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E. Unitary Theory and Employment Law
The Unitary influence upon the law of employment precedes the
introduction of collective bargaining and the recognition of trade unions.
Its first traces may be discerned in the realm of the law of master and
servant rather than in that of collective labour law. One can divide the
period in which the Unitary influence has been discernible into three
eras: (1) the Master and Servant era (prior to the mid-nineteenth century);
(2) the Contract of Employment era (mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth
century); and (3) the Collective Bargaining era (post-World War l]).26
Only the first two periods need principally concern us here. The
significance of the Unitary perspective during the third phase of
management-labour relations shall be examined under the Pluralist and
Radical models.
F. The Influence upon Master and Servant Law
The growth of economic enterprise in the late eighteenth century,
as Bendix notes, was responsible for stimulating a massive demand for
labour.27 These economic changes subsequently reflected themselves in
the law in the evolution of the employment contract. However, prior
to this, employment relations were largely influenced by the law of master
and servant, and reflected broad social inequalities. Employment relations
tended to be personal in nature, and at least from the employee's point
of view, all-encompassing. In return for fulfilling traditional, basic
obligations of remuneration and accommodation, the master was entitled
to expect complete loyalty and obedience from his employees with respect
to a wide range of matters, even extending beyond the immediate context
of the workplace. As Selznick explained it:
The law of master and servant was rooted in a society in which everyone was
presumed to belong somewhere, and the great parameters of belonging were kinship,
locality, religion, occupation and social class. In all spheres of life, including spiritual
communion, subordination to legitimate authority was thought to be a natural,
inevitable and welcome accompaniment of moral grace and practical virtue.2s
Only a few matters, principally the term of employment and
remuneration, were subject to mutual bargaining and assent. As for other
issues, "custom and policy, not the will of the parties, defined the implicit
framework of rights and obligations. In the routine case, most of the
26 In dividing the recent history of Anglo-Canadian employment relations into these three
periods, the dates given are approximate only but sufficient to indicate the relevant chronology.
The earlier feudal period shall not be discussed.
27 Supra, note 18 at 16-17.
28 Selznick, Supra, note 11 at 123.
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terms and conditions of employment were implied by law rather than
set by mutual agreement."29 Traditional master and servant law perpet-
uated, through a series of express and implied terms, a view of the
employment relationship in which employees were naturally, and firmly,
subordinated to the broad discretion of their employers on a wide range
of work-related and nonwork-related matters.
G. Employer Authority and the Contract of Employment
Many of these attitudes persisted into the nineteenth century, and
influenced employment relations in the Contract of Employment era.
The increasing resort to contract as a means of ordering legal relations,
together with the spread of egalitarian philosophies during this century,
posed distinct problems for ordering relations in the workplace.3o Con-
tractual concepts of voluntarism and approximate equivalence of bar-
gaining power threatened to undermine the legitimacy of traditional
master-servant type relationships: "The damaging implication of pure
contract doctrine for the employer would have been that it could not
allow him to be the sole judge of whether his rules were arbitrary or
exceeded the scope of his authority."31
The contradiction inherent in this situation, Fox argued, was cir-
cumvented or at least de-emphasized by the infusion of the employment
contract: ".... with the traditional law of master and servant, thereby
granting them [that is management] a legal basis for the prerogative
they demanded. What resulted was a form of contract almost as far
removed from the pure doctrinal form as the status relationship which
had preceded it."32 In other words, the nineteenth-century courts were
able to imply into employment law a range of terms which bore a
remarkable resemblance to terms implied in master and servant law.
Thus, despite the contractualist forms in which the management-labour
relationship was expressed, the law of employment was able to provide
for the maintenance of feudalistic managerial authority by "personifying
the [employment] relationship in terms of total subordination to com-
mand."33 Broad philosophical currents, including the notional labour
market freedom of classical economics, and the applicability of contractual
29/bid
30 Supra, note 18 at 440.
31 Fosc, Supra, note 12 at 183.
2 Ibid at 184.
33 Joseph, supra, note 12 at 90. See also P. Craven, "The Law of Master and Servant in
Mid-Nineteenth Century Ontario" in D. Flaherty, ed., Essays in the History of Canadian Law, Volume
I (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981).
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freedom and individual responsibility in arranging one's affairs, also served
to commend to employees ideologically the view that their subordination
to the authority and direction of management was voluntary and a matter
of mutual assent, rather than the product of an inequitable class-divided
society in which they possessed little bargaining power. Dissatisfied
employees were always "free" therefore to renegotiate the terms of their
employment at the end of their contract or to go elsewhere.
The common law position concerning dismissal and the duty to obey
perhaps best indicate the extent of legal subordination of workers to
management control. First, it may be observed that the power of dismissal
directly pertains not only to employee job security, but also to man-
agement's interest in labour mobility, and stands as management's ultimate
sanction in securing employee compliance. Yet in mid-nineteenth-century
England, dismissal often was not an issue, for the practice emerged of
"minute contracts," contracts terminable at a moment's notice by the
employer or the employee. For a period, this practice replaced the former
presumption of a yearly hiring which had characterized previous master
and servant law.34 But even when this practice was replaced by a
requirement of notice or dismissal for "cause," it seems to have affected
only marginally the power legally exercised by the employer over the
workplace. The extent of this power is neatly captured by Freedland
in his discussion of the employer's right of dismissal for disobedience:
The rule that an employee may be dismissed for wilful disobedience to any lawful
order has the effect of allowing the employer a prerogative to issue any work-
directions he may please to the employee subject only to the limitations that the
order does not expose the employee to immediate danger to life or limb or require
him to engage in unlawful conduct.35
The obligation to obey generally represented an implied term of
hiring,6 the breach of which typically resulted in dismissal. As Freedland
notes, the common law recognized few exceptions. The arbitrary nature
of the employer's discretion at law is strikingly revealed in the following
passage from Macdonel's The Law of Master and Servant (1908):
The general rule.., is, as Baron Parke said in Turner v. Mason, that "the obligation
of a domestic servant is to obey all lawful commands." It matters not how
inconvenient to the servant, or how harsh or cruel the orders may be; they may
be even unreasonable; provided they be lawful and within the scope of his
employment, he must obey them on pain of dismissal. "The master is to be the
3' M. Freedland, The Contract of Employment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976) at 144.
35 Ibid at 199 (footnotes omitted). See also Sir . Macdonell, The Law of Master and Servant
(London: Stevens, 1908) at 18.
36 The obedience obligation has been described as "a natural and necessary extension of the
implied obligation to work." See L Christie, Employment Law in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths,
1980) at 274.
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judge," as Baron Parke observes in the same case, "of the circumstances under
which the servant's services are required, subject to this, that he is to give only
lawful commands." 37
Yet the Unitary ideology cannot be simply dismissed as an extinct
nineteenth-century philosophy; rather it is clear that it continues to
influence employment law today. Two examples of this influence upon
private sector employment relationships may be given. First, in distin-
guishing between a contract for services and a contract of service, the
courts have traditionally relied upon the so-called "control test" method
of identifying the contract of service (that is the traditional employment
contract).38 The use of the term "control" indicates quite clearly the concept
of employee subordination to management which is envisaged and
legitimated by this test. Secondly, even in some cases the courts retain
the terminology and approach of the courts of the last century. For
example, in a 1974 decision of the Alberta Supreme Court, R v. Mac's
Milk Ltd39 the court ascribed a contemporary relevance to the master
and servant concept in modem employment law:
In my opinion, the words "employer and employee" are equated with the words
"master and servant." The word "servant" is, in these modem days, regarded as
objectionable or demeaning and workers do not like to think or speak of their
employer as "master," but the principles governing the kind of relationship which
exists between persons rendering service and those to whom the services are rendered
remain the same.4O
Historically, then, it cannot be doubted that the general common
law of employment has perpetuated a strong view of employee sub-
ordination to management control, by adopting a Unitary approach to
management-labour relations whereunder terms favourable to manage-
ment have been routinely implied in contracts of employment. Such a
clearcut legal endorsement of Unitary principles raises the prima facie
difficulty of its reconciliation with any system based on employee
participation in decision making. This aspect will be further discussed
37 Supra, note 35 at 171. For an example of the harshness with which this rule was applied
against servants, see Turner v. Mason (1845) 14 LJ. Ex. 311, 153 E.R 411 (Ex.).
38 See Yemens v. Noakes (1880), 6 Q.B.C. 530 (C.A. Ex. Div.); Performing Right Society v.
Mitchell and Brooker (Palais de Danse) Ltd (1922), [1924] 1 KB. 762 in which McCardie J. at
768 quoted Pollock on Torts (12th ed.) with approval: "A master is one who not only prescribes
to the workman the end of his work, but directs or may at any moment direct the means also..
at 79-80.
39 (1974), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 714.
40 lbid at 725-26 [emphasis is mine]. See also Master and Servant Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 257
where s. 3, covering agreements between worker and master which provide for a share in the
profits of the business in lieu of wages, states that unless expressly provided, such an agreement
does not "(b) give to the workman, servant or employee the right to examine into the accounts
or interfere in the management of affairs of the trade, calling or business."
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under the Pluralist model. This problem, however, seems even more acute
when the common law of public employment is considered, where a
stronger version of the Unitary model has been disclosed.
H. The Law Affecting Civil Servants
In view of the important influence of principles of military organ-
ization upon managerial thinking in the nineteenth century, it should
not be surprising that the employment position of military servants at
common law influenced the legal position of civil servants in the way
that it did. It is perhaps more surprising to note that in many ways the
law for these groups closely resembled the general law of master and
servant already described concerning the question of managerial authority.
While the notions of Crown prerogative and parliamentary sovereignty
have been used as justifications peculiar to the defence of public employer
managerial prerogatives, the justifications used by public and private
sector managers to legitimate their traditional role and functions bear
marked similarities to each other. However, the distinctive rationales
offered for broad public employer prerogatives are nonetheless interesting
in demonstrating the apparent need, identified by Bendix, for shifts in
the justifications used to legitimate traditional managerial legitimate
authority, in order to secure the voluntary compliance of employees.4'
The common law position of civil servants of the Crown has recently
been described by Wade as being in a "primitive state of legal evolution."42
To the extent it has been or remains primitive, it reveals that the courts
have tended to support public employers in assuming a rather high-handed
and autocratic attitude towards civil servants. Despite various judicial
interventions and statutory modifications of the common law position
of employees since the last century, it shall be submitted later that the
Unitary approach continues to influence collective bargaining law in the
public sector. But first, the common law evolution of this approach needs
to be established and described, so as to best recognize its subsequent
influence upon the law of collective bargaining.
Under English common law, ".... civil servants of the Crown, and
military servants also, have no legal right to their salaries and no legal
protection against wrongful dismissal.",3 As defined, this Crown power
over its employees is very broad and the potential for its arbitrary exercise
41 See generally Bendix, supra, note 18.
42 H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law, 5th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) at 62.
43 Ibid
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would seem considerable." In the past, civil servants took what comfort
could be derived, not from the common law, but from the convention
of security of tenure associated with employment in the civil service.
The exclusivity and extent of the Crown's common law power over
its military servants was demonstrated in obiter of the Court of King's
Bench in China Navigation Co. Ltd v. Attorney General:,5
As Lord Kenyon said in Macdonald v. Steele, where an officer is asking the
Paymaster-General for his half-pay, "His Majesty's pleasure supersedes all enquiry,
as he has the absolute discretion and command of the army... the administration
of the army is in the hands of the King, who unless expressly controlled by an
Act of Parliament cannot be controlled by the Courts.46
This power the Crown has over its servants, while presumed to arise
as an incident of its prerogatives over the armed forces, has also been
recognized by the courts on the ground that there is no employment
or other form of contract between the Crown and its military servants.47
As Wade has argued, "[i]t was in fact the decisions about military
service which provided persuasive precedents for the decisions about civil
service,"48 in particular concerning the rule that civil servants are
dismissible at pleasure. However, judicial attempts to justify this rule
in its application to non-military civil servants have been less compelling,
tending to convey the simple message that it is essentially nobody else's
business but the Crown's as to how it treats its servants.
For example, the Privy Council in Shenton v. Smith- held that
generally the dismissal at pleasure rule applied not as a matter of Crown
prerogative but "because such are the terms of their engagement, as
is well understood throughout the public service." If the common law
were otherwise, it would "seriously impede the working of the public
service,"50 the Privy Council concluded.
44 However, in Canada, at least since Rei/ley v. R (1934), 1 D.L.R. 434 (P.C.), there seems
to have been a judicial reluctance to enforce this principle where an employment contract could
be established; and where a conflict arose between the terms of a collective agreement and the
statutory embodiment of the dismissal at pleasure rule: see Crossman v. City of Peterborough (1966),
58 D.LR. (2d) 218 (Ont. C.A.); Nova Scotia Government Employees' Association v. Civil Service
Commission of Nova Scotia (1981), 12 C.L.L.C. 207 (S.C.C.).
45 (1930), [1932] 2 K.B. 197.
46 Ibid at 215 (footnote omitted), per Scratton L., also Dickson v. Combermere (1983), 3
F.S.F. 526, 176 E.R. 236 (Q.B.).
47 See P. Hogg, Liablity of the Crown (Melbourne: Law Book Society, 1971) at 150-51.
48 Supra, note 42 at 65.
49 (1895), [1895] A.C. 229 (P.C.).
50 Ibid at 235.
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Another example of the judiciary's willingness to defend almost
peremptorily the arbitrariness of the Crown's approach to its servants'
employment predicament is provided by the judgement of Rowlatt J.
in The Amphitrites, Here, readiness of the courts to defer to vague "Crown
knows best" reasoning in these matters emerged clearly in a discussion
concerning the rule that the Crown may not fetter its future executive
action by contract or other means:
It is not competent for the Government to fetter its future executive action, which
must necessarily be determined by the needs of the community when the question
arises. It cannot by contract hamper its freedom of action in matters which concern
the welfare of the State. Thus in the case of the employment of public servants
which is a less strong case than the present, it has been laid down that, except
under an Act of Parliament, no one acting on behalf of the Crown has authority
to employ any person upon the terms that he is dismissible at the Crown's pleasure
the reason being that it is in the interests of the community that the ministers
for the time being advising the Crown should be able to dispense with the services
of its employees if they think it desirable.52
A similar judicial approach emerges when the law concerning local
government employees is considered. Note the broad, loose justifications
offered by the Court for a right of dismissal of municipal employees
in Ziegler v. City of Victoria.53 This was a British Columbia decision
involving an action for wrongful dismissal brought by a former driver
of a city fire truck which had been involved in a collision with a street
car. In this decision, Morrison J. opined:
From the letter of the legislation appertaining to municipalities as well as from
the philosophy underlying that legislation, I agree with the submission that the
enactment dealing with these powers should receive a liberal interpretation to
the end that the department may function effectively. There is nothing in the
Municipal Act or amendments thereto which is not in consonance with the principle
of law that from the reason of the thing, from the nature of corporations and
for the sake of order and government, the power to remove is one of the common
law incidents of all corporations....
This decision is particularly interesting because it suggests a wil-
lingness by the courts to resort to this type of policy justification, both
in the cause of statutory interpretation and in developing common law
doctrine.
While it is clear that in Canada various common law and statutory
developments have modified and mitigated certain aspects of the common
51 (1921), [1921J 3 K.B. 500.
52 Ibid at 503.
53 (1921), 30 B.C.L.R. 389; also (1922), 70 D.L.R. 722.
54 Ibid. at 391; also L Rogers, The Law of Canadian Municipal Corporatdon4 2d ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 1983) at 292-95.
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law position of public employees described above,55 the point here has
been to illustrate a particular approach to the employment predicament
of these employees which is also evident in recent legislative and judicial
approaches to public employee collective bargaining law. By establishing
a substantial continuity of approach between Unitary individual employ-
ment law and Pluralist collective bargaining law in the next section,
as it is planned to do, serious doubt is cast upon the significance of
Pluralist modifications to the common law in terms of substantially altering
the balance of power between management and employees.
III. THE PLURALIST MODEL
A. A General View
It has been observed that the Pluralist view of the workplace, as
indeed of society, "probably represents the received orthodoxy in many
Western societies." 56 Yet it is by no means a wholly homogeneous
perspective. Furthermore, as it has also been observed, it has been a
viewpoint probably more often forced upon management rather than
warmly embraced by it.57
B. Limited Conflict as Natural
Contrary to the Unitary perspective, Pluralism expressly recognizes
a divergence of legitimate interests and objectives within the workplace
as well as within society. These interests are viewed as being in competition
with each other for the attainment of their separate objectives and therefore
come into conflict. Often in the workplace, the basic conflict of interests
and objectives can be construed as one essentially between employee
security and managerial efficiency.58 These concerns are usually phrased
in terms of what percentage of profits is to be devoted to employee
55 For examples of common law developments, see supra, note 44. In terms of statutory
developments, public employees in common with private sector employees have been affected by
the enactment of various employment standards, statutes, and human rights legislation. See at the
national level, Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-l; Federal Fair Wages and Hours of Labour
Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-3; in Ontario, the Ontario Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 228; the
Employment Standards Act, RIS.O. 1980, c. 137, and the Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.O.
1980, c. 321.
56 Fox, supra, note 4 at 26. The Woods Task Force has expressly recognized the acceptability
of pluralism in Canada. See Canadian Industrial Relations The Report of the Task Force on Labour
Relations (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1974) (Chairman: H.D. Woods) [hereinafter the Woods Report]
at 30.
57 Fox, supra, note 1 at 6; Flanders, supra, note 17 at 172. Here is an example of an overlap
in practice between the Unitary and Pluralist perspectives.
58 England, supra, note 4 at 226.
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wages or how productivity and profitability are best ensured through
the organization of the workplace.
While workplace conflict is accepted as inevitable, under Pluralism
it is tolerable only within certain limits. This is because it is recognized
that in the workplace, management and the employees must depend on
each other if both groups are to advance their interests and objectives.59
Therefore, a mutual necessity to survive and a shared desire to prosper
fosters an interdependence which also constrains the amount of conflict
between the parties consistent with their mutual survival and prosperity.
Basic shared assumptions about the nature of the enterprise (a "common
ideology"6o) serve to integrate the parties into a functional working
relationship. Differences of opinion, which separate management from
employees, are not seen as being unbridgeable. As Schienstock explains
it: ".... conflict itself is not viewed as being unresolvable. Conflict is
thus not understood to represent an antagonistic antithesis; the ideological
premise of this approach is rather a philosophy of mutual survival."6
Pluralism as an ideology therefore narrowly defines the amount of
workplace conflict tolerable as well as portrays the prospects for resolving
any differences as being both realistic and necessary for the advancement
of both groups. The principal institution whereby conflict is restrained
and resolved is collective bargaining.
C. Collective Bargaining as Pluralist Policy
Since World War H, collective bargaining has assumed primary
importance in management-labour relations in Canada, both as principal
ingredient in the "common ideology" of Pluralism, and as a matter of
national labour policy.62 This is scarcely surprising given that the idea
of collective bargaining is expressly premised upon an acceptance of
the existence of divergent management and employee interests in the
workplace and of the need for their mutual accommodation. Collective
bargaining lies at the centre of Pluralist labour relations. However, the
issues of the legitimate scope of these divergent interests and the extent
to which interests can be accommodated within collective bargaining
raises a fundamental area of uncertainty in the Pluralist model, namely,
59 Flanders, supra, note 17 at 246.
60 England, supra, note 4 at 226.
61 Supra, note 4 at 174.
62 England, supra, note 4 at 226; also Woods Report, supra, note 56; H.D. Woods, Labour
Policy in Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1973) at c. 1.
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the relationship between managerial authority and collective bargaining.
Before considering this issue, however, the Pluralist conception of
collective bargaining requires clarification.
On this view, collective bargaining signifies a set of procedures
whereby management and employees can reconcile their differences
concerning the governance of the workplace in some fashion. In order
to do so, the parties must share a fundamental commitment to the process
of collective bargaining. Clearly both managements and employees must
perceive this process generally to be fair if a real commitment is to
exist on both sides. Emphasis therefore is laid upon the procedural
machinery for resolving disputes, rather than upon the substantive
outcomes.63
Bargaining between the parties, it is asserted, should be free and
voluntary. The following statement by Pluralist scholar Archibald Cox
sums up the reasoning behind this view: "In my opinion the needs of
the industrial community would be served best by leaving management
and union free to determine by the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement what shall be the respective rights of the unions and the
individual in its administration."64
Free bargaining necessarily implies some sort of rough equivalence
of bargaining power between management and employees, or at least
no clear-cut duress by one side against the other.6 The role of the union
under Pluralism is to serve as a "countervailing power" to the power
of management, and therefore to contribute to an equivalence of sorts
in bargaining power between the parties.66 Some form of equivalence
is necessary if employee participation in decision making is to be secured.
In order to secure this participation in decision making, however, the
subordination of individual employees' claims and interests vis-a-vis the
union is required.67 The collective employee power of the union is justified
in terms of its necessity in advancing the overall position of the trade
union members, that is the employees.
63 England, supra, note 4 at 227; Flanders, supra, note 17 at 251.
64 A. Cox, "Rights Under a Labor Agreement" (1956) 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601 at 618; Flanders,
supra, 17 at 246. For a discussion of the influence of contractual ideas upon collective bargaining,
see Selznick, supra, note 11 at 139.
65 H. Clegg, "Pluralism in Industrial Relations" (1975) 13 Brit. J. Indus. Rel. 309 at 314.
66 This has been the official view of the union role adopted in Canada. See Woods Report,
supra, note 56 at paras. 296, 299.
67 Cox, supra, note 64 at 657; England, supra, note 4 at 231.
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Implicit in the "countervailing power" thesis, as Hyman has noted,68
is a basic distrust of power. This distrust is reflected in the Pluralist
view of collective bargaining as an exercise in bilateral rulemaking.69
By participating in the formulation of work rules, it is argued that unions
contribute to the establishment of constraints upon the exercise of
managerial discretion on a whole range of work-related matters. This
is a widely shared perspective upon the role of collective bargaining.
For example, the Woods Task Force described collective bargaining as
"the substitution of the rule of law for the rule of man in the workplace,"0
while Feller noted that the collective agreement is "commonly visualized
as an intrusion on the prerogatives of an unrestrained management -
a concession won by the workforce from a resisting employer."7 The
running of the workplace according to a set of predetermined, written
rules, which is the essence of collective agreements, of course, is also
a feature of the bureaucratic approach to management.72
In terms of hierarchy and the division of labour, employee par-
ticipation in joint decision making and managerial submission to gov-
ernance by written rules suggests that to the extent of those issues covered
by the jointly determined collective agreements, the Pluralist would
recognize a less rigidly hierarchical form of governance, under which
the employee role was not confined to the execution of tasks, but also
extended to the manner in which tasks were performed, and even to
participating in broader policy decisions.
Submission of the workplace to rules also emphasizes another strand
of the Pluralist collective bargaining philosophy: the importance of
industrial peace for the "public interest.",3 On this view, industrial order
is self-evidently consonant with the public interest. The submission of
inter partes conflicts to a formalized dispute resolution machinery, which
includes the imposition of restrictions upon the timing and other conditions
68 "Pluralism, Procedural Consensus and Collective Bargaining" (1978) 16 Brit. J. Indus. Rel.
16 at 27.
69 Flanders, supra, note 17 at 216.
70 Woods Report. Supra, note 56 at 296.
71 See D. Feller, "A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement" (1973) 61 Cal.
L. Rev. 663 at 721-22. See also, generally, Selznick, supra, note 11, especially c. 4; P. Weiler,
Reconcilable Differences (Agincourt, Ont.: Carswell, 1980) at 27-34.
72 See text accompanying notes 20-23.
73 This theme is reflected in many aspects of collective bargaining. For example, see the Preamble
to the Ontario Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 228: "[i]t is in the public interest... to further
harmonious relations between employers and employees by encouraging the practice and procedure
of collective bargaining between employers and trade unions as the freely designated representatives
of employees."
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of conflict, constitutes a means for the "institutionalisation of conflict,"7,
whereby conflict is kept within "reasonable" limits and therefore man-
ageable in the sense of not threatening the overall fabric of the industrial
order in the workplace. This function attributed by Pluralism to collective
bargaining confirms the earlier observation that the degree of workplace
conflict tolerable under the Pluralist model is strictly limited.
D. Pluralistic Theory and Collective Bargaining Law
Similar to what was done under the Unitary model, it is proposed
at this point to examine the expression of Pluralist values and assumptions
in collective bargaining law and to examine ways in which the Pluralist
ideology is sustained by the form and substance of this law. Because
this law also limits and influences the nature of the relationship between
the parties and between collective bargaining procedures and management
practices, it pertains directly to the form of management control in any
organization subject to these laws, and therefore requires examination.
Separate attention will be given to the legal impact of collective
bargaining upon private and public sector managements. Critical questions
which should form the basis for the study of this law vis-&i-vis management
control are: (1) how much shared decision making is envisaged under
the system of collective bargaining? and (2) if only a limited degree
of sharing is provided for, how are these parameters formulated and
in what areas does this sharing take place? These limits may be determined
according to normative principles or as the result of a power struggle,
or even from a combination of the two. Despite the symbolic voluntarism
associated with collective bargaining,75 it is somewhat paradoxical but
nonetheless evident under the Pluralist model that certain limits do exist
upon the subject matters deemed suitable for shared decision making
by collective bargaining. The nature and scope of these limits, the forms
that participation takes, and the justifications used to explain these limits
and forms, need to be examined in order to assess the theoretical coherence
of Pluralism, and in particular to enable an assessment of the degree
74 See generally Dahrendorf, supra, note 10 at 64-67:
Organization presupposes the legitimacy of conflict groups, and it thereby removes the
permanent and incalculable threat of guerilla warfare. At the same time, it makes systematic
regulation of conflicts possible. Organization is institutionalization, and whereas its manifest
function is usually an increasingly articulate and outspoken defense of interests, it invariably
has the latent function also of inaugurating routines of conflict which contribute to reducing
the violence of clashes of interest.
75 Woods Report, supra, note 56 at 106.
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of correspondence between Pluralist rhetoric and the way collective
bargaining law operates in practice.76
1. The private sector
Whatever the initial reasons for the formation of trade unions and
the recognition of collective bargaining, since its introduction, collective
bargaining has extended its domain to matters additional to those
"personnel" matters with primarily economic consequences, for example
wages, pensions, allowances. Collective bargaining legislation commonly
has been vague as to which matters are suitable for shared decision
making, beyond stating, for example, that collective agreements shall
deal with "terms or conditions of employment."77 As Simmons and Swan
point out, in marked contrast to collective agreements in the public sector:
"Apart from the few statutory requirenments (such as no strike clauses,
arbitration clauses and the like) private sector collective agreements are
virtually unfettered in Canada: nearly anything can be bargained and
become a binding element in an agreement."78
Furthermore, following the 1978 decision of the British Columbia
Labour Relations Board in Pulp and Paper Bureau v. Canadian Paper-
workers' Union,79 the view emerged in Canada that: "the evolution of
the subjects of collective bargaining should be the result of pragmatic
accommodations worked out by unions and employers in their individual
relationships, responding to the nuances of their own situation."8o This
position contrasts with the distinction drawn in American labour law
between mandatory and permissive topics of bargaining, whereunder only
topics designated as mandatory are subject to the statutory duty of parties
to bargain in good faith.81 At least in private sector employment, then,
there would seem to exist no substantial legal or other impediment of
principle to the parties negotiating as to the scope of bargaining itself.
While this situation may be (and has been) prevented from arising by
76 Two Pluralists who have been expressly critical of the shortcomings of collective bargaining
practice when measured against the rhetoric of industrial democracy are Clyde Summers and David
Beatty. See C. Summers, "Industrial Democracy: America's Unfulfilled Promise" (1979) 28 Clev.
State L. Rev. 29; D. Beatty, "Ideology, Politics and Unionism" in Swan & Swinton, supra, note
4.
77 Ontario Labour Relations Act, supra, note 55, s. l(IXe).
78 C. Simmons & K. Swan, eds, Labour Relations in the Public Sector (Kingston: Industrial
Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1982).
79 (1977), [1978] 1 C.L.R.B. Rep. 60 [hereinafter Pulp and Paper].
80 Ibid at 79.
81 For a comparison of the American and Canadian law, see W.B. Gould, A Primer of American
Labor Law (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1982); see also Langille, infra, note 94.
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other reasons such as economic power, considerable legal authority does
exist and can be found to support an "open-ended" form of collective
bargaining under which the scope of bargaining is legally amenable to
negotiation by management and employees.
Where a defensive attitude by the law towards "managerial pre-
rogatives" in the private sector does emerge is in the administration of
the collective agreement. In consideration for a prohibition upon strikes
and lockouts during the period of the agreement, it has been usual to
provide in bargaining legislation for a binding arbitration mechanism
dealing with matters concerning the interpretation, application and alleged
violation of the agreement.82 During the course of the collective agreement,
the agreement serves as the basic instrument of governance of the
management-labour relationship, and therefore deals with initiatives from
both management and employees to alter workplace relations in response
to changing social, economic, and technological conditions.83 Plant
closures, re-locations, lay-offs, subcontracting, and the introduction of
new technology have been some of the strategic issues confronted by
arbitration in the last two decades. In order to decide how the spirit
and letter of the collective agreements are to be interpreted with respect
to these issues, arbitrators have been obliged to adopt some theory of
managerial prerogatives with which to resolve the inevitable tensions
between management and employees on these and other issues.
Canadian labour arbitration, it is agreed, has given rise to two
analytically distinct approaches to these problems since the 1950s.84 The
less influential approach to the question of managerial "prerogatives"
has been that identified with the arbitration philosophy of former Chief
Justice Bora Laskin as reflected in the Peterborough Lock8s arbitration
in which he was chairman. It has occasionally been referred to as the
"joint sovereignty" theory.86 Pursuant to this theory, collective bargaining
constitutes a "new broom" with which the parties must sweep away
pre-existing notions concerning the bases of their employment relationship
82 See supra, note 77, ss. 42, 44.
83 This point is succinctly made by Canada Task Force on Labour Relations, Labour Arbitration
and Industrial Change (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969) at 1.
84 See D. Brown & D. Beatty, Canadian Arbitration (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1984)
at c. 1; E. Palmer, Collective Agreement Arbitration in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at
c. 14; Weiler, supra, note 71 at 94.
85 Re Peterborough Lock Mfg Co Ltd (1953), 4 L.A.C. 1499 [hereinafter Peterborough Lock].
See also Re Sudbwy Mine Mill and Smelter Workers; Local 598 and Falconbridge Nickel Mines (1958),
8 L.A.C. 276 [hereinafter Falconbridge Nickel], another award in which Mr. Justice Laskin's approach
was evident.
86 D. Beatty, "The Role of the Arbitrator: A Liberal Version" (1984) 34 U.T.LJ. 136, especially
at 147.
19861
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
and examine the bases anew. As part of this approach to arbitration,
one could not presume in the absence of express terms in collective
agreements limiting the discretion of management that management's
discretion was necessarily unfettered in these areas, preventing any
restraint by employees, their unions, or by arbitrators. On this view,
managerial discretion is constrained not just by express words in the
agreement but by the context in which the collective agreement emerges
and operates, including the "customs and written understandings, estab-
lished practices and sound industrial relations standards" operating in
a particular industry.,, These contextual considerations in effect provide
an extended, industrial "rule of law" to which management must conform.
The analytic break signified by the change from common law employment
principles to collective bargaining law carried with it, at least for some
adherents of the joint sovereignty thesis,.8 a fairly novel presumption
concerning open recognition and acceptance of employee participation
on an extended range of subject-matters requiring decision making,
compared with that previously tolerated at common law.
It is now recognized, however, that for all practical purposes this
approach has almost totally disappeared.89 In its place has come the
"management's reserved rights" doctrine or "residual theory." This
approach recognizes, implicitly or explicitly, a pre-bargaining era sup-
posedly characterized by complete managerial sovereignty in terms of
controlling the workplace. For example, according to the arbitral decision
in Ritchie Cut Stone.9o "... management historically had the power to
do anything in relation to its employees that the operation of the business
required without restriction."9, Under the purest form of this doctrine,
management's "right to manage" is only limited to the extent expressly
conceded by the terms of the agreement and no more.9 The agreement
is the first and last document necessary to be consulted by arbitrators,
87 A. Cox & J. Dunlop, "The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the Term of an Existing
Agreement" (1950) 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1097 at 1119. See, for other expressions of this approach,
Falconbridge Nickel supra, note 85 at 282; also A. Goldberg, "Management's Reserved Rights:
A Labor View" in J. McKelvey, ed., Management's Rights and the Arbitration Process (Washington,
D.C.: B.N.A. Incorporated, 1956).
88 See particularly Laskin J. in Peterborough Lock, supra, note 85 at 1502.
89 Supra, note 84.
90 (1966), 17 L.A.C. 202.
91 Ibid at 206. The historical accuracy of this position is extremely suspect. See J. Atleson,
Values and Assumptions in American LaborLaw (Amherst University of Massachusetts Press, 1983)
at 107; Braverman, supra, note 15; J. Zeitlin, "The Labour Strategies of British Engineering Employers,
1890-1922" in H. Gospel and C. Littler, eds, Managerial Strategies and Industrial Relationx' An
Historical and Comparative Study (London: Heinemann, 1983).
92 See J. Phelps, "Management's Reserved Rights: An Industry View" in McKelvey, supra,
note 87.
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judges, and others in determining the will of the parties and therefore
the nature of the relationship between management and the workforce.
In other words, but for the agreement: "management has absolute
discretion in the hiring, firing, and the organisation and direction of the
working forces, subject only to such limitations as may be imposed by
law."93
This is essentially the approach adopted by the Ontario Labour
Relations Board in Re Amoco Fabrics Ltd and some of its other recent
decisions.94 For example, the Board in Amoco Fabrics approached the
management control collective bargaining relationship in the following
terms:
Collective bargaining under the [Ontario Labour Relations] Act is premised on
the exercise of traditional management rights by employers to the extent that those
rights are not abrogated by statute or by the terms of a collective agreement.
Absent some contractual restriction, it is generally the prerogative of the employer
to finance, organis plan and direct its enterprise in the way that it sees fit. As
some recent plant closures have demonstrated, errors of judgement in these areas
can be fatal to an enterprise. As part of the scheme of collective bargaining employees
and the trade unions that represent them understand and accept that they are
generally vulnerable to the success or failure of decisions taken by management,
just as they are to market forces beyond their employer's control. Considerable
latitude must be given to management in the exercise of its judgement95
Plainly then, on the face of this approach by the Board one can ascertain
not just the adoption of a "reserved rights" approach by the Board but
also a marked departure from the philosophy and approach exhibited
in the Pulp and Paper96 decision.
However it must be stated that the judicial and arbitral acceptance
of this restrictive approach has not been uniform or without exceptions.
Some courts and arbitrators have imposed some express limitations upon
the "reserved rights" doctrine, although as Brown and Beatty have
observed, the overall role of the arbitrator on these questions has remained
an "essentially passive" one.97 In recent years, some arbitrators have
allowed a duty upon management to exercise its unilateral powers in
a fair manner98 to be implied into many agreements. The duty has been
93 Ibid
94 (1982), [1982] O.L.R.B. Rep. 314 [hereinafter Amoco Fabrics]; see also Re Westinghouse
Ltd(1980), [1980] O.L.R.B. Rep. 577. This approach has recently been endorsed by the U.S. Supreme
Court in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB., 452 U.S. 666 (1981). See B. Langille, "'Equal
Partnership' in Canadian Labour Law" (1983) 21 O.H.LJ. 496.
95 Amoco Fabrics, supra, note 94 at 323 [emphasis is mine].
96 Supra, note 79.
97 Supra, note 84 at 13.
98 Ibid at 202-06; Palmer, supra, note 84 at 589-95.
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variously expressed as a duty to act in good faith, to act reasonably99
and to act fairly.oo The standard used by arbitrators to determine fairness
is revealing in illustrating the close similarities between at least some
interpretations of the Pluralist perspective and the Unitary perspective.
It was spelled out in Re United Parcel Service Canada Ltd:o,
In our view the employer's decision making should be assessed against the
requirement to act for business reasons and the requirement not to single out
any employee or group of employees for special treatment which cannot be justified
in terms of real benefit to the employer. When the parties agree that such matters
as classification, qualification, demotion, transfers and the scheduling of vacations
are to be in the discretion of management they do so in the knowledge that
management's decision making in these areas will be made in management's self
interest, may adversely affect individual employees, and/or may not impact on
all employees equally. However, it is not contemplated as part of the bargain
that the employer will exercise his authority in these areas for reasons unrelated
to the betterment of his business or to single out employees for the type of special
treatment described. If the employer acts in this manner, the results of his actions,
as they affect the bargaining unit generally or individuals within the bargaining
unit, may be found to be beyond the scope of his authority under the collective
agreement' 0 2
This duty to act fairly has been applied to a wide variety of work
issues, including demotions, vacations, promotions, shift schedulings,
effecting retirements, and settling grievances.03 However, some uncer-
tainty continues to surround the scope of this duty and the degree of
protection it extends to employees even given the limited significance
of the "business" standard and the non-arbitrary criteria set out in decisions
such as United Parcel Service.,o, An Ontario Court of Appeal decision
and some recent arbitration decisionso5 have continued to adopt a strict,
literal approach to the interpretation and application of collective agree-
ments. This has meant, for instance in Re Metropolitan Toronto Board
of Commissioners of Police,6 that the Court of Appeal has refused to
imply an obligation upon management to exercise its rights under the
99 Re International Nickel Co. of Canada Ltd and United Steel Workers; Local 6500 (1977),
14 LAC. (2d) 13 at 18.
100 Re United Parcel Service Canada Ltd and Teamsters Union, Local 141 (1981), 29 L.A.C.
(2d) 202 at 213.
101 Ibid
02 Ibid
103 Ibid For an extensive list of authorities on this point, see the decisions listed in Brown
& Beatty, supra, note 84 at 204-05.
104 Supra, note 100. For a discussion of the ambivalence expressed in the Ontario courts and
among arbitrators on this doctrine, see Beatty, supra, note 86.
105 See Re Georgina College of Applied Arts and Technology and OPSEU (1984), 10 LA.C.
(3d) 359.
106 (1981), 124 D.LR (3d) 684 (Ont. C.A.).
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agreement "fairly and without discretion" on the grounds that the
agreement in question contained a "zipper" clause which precluded the
implication of any terms.lol Yet a year later, the Court of Appeal on
a judicial review in Re Council of Printing Industries of Canada & Toronto
Printing Pressmen & Assistants Unions No. 10 et aLlo8 refused to find an
arbitrator's construction of an agreement unreasonable despite the fact
that the arbitrator had resorted to criteria of good faith and reasonableness
in reaching his decisions. Thus the precise extent and status of the duty
of fairness incursion into managerial prerogatives has remained
unresolved.
However, a continuation of the "free bargaining" philosophy ex-
hibited in such decisions as Pulp and Paper and an arbitral concern for
business efficiency, as evidenced by decisions such as Amoco Fabrics,
seem likely to confine the duty in future to quite narrowly prescribed
limits.,oo This seems particularly likely when arbitrators are faced with
"zipper" clauses such as that which arose in Re Metro Toronto Board
of Commissioners of Police.1lo In sum, there is a clear message arising
from the judicial, labour board and arbitral jurisprudence, in both the
narrow and broad approaches to arbitration and to the doctrine of fairness,
that certain areas of decision making exist, which, for pragmatic if no
other reasons, belong rightfully to management and should not be
interfered with by others. This narrow, dominant arbitral approach
recognizes and values business efficiency clearly above the role of
collective bargaining as an "intrinsically valuable experience in self-
government.",, This is despite the obvious fact that an arbitral recognition
of a need for a fairness doctrine in interpreting and applying collective
agreements, however narrow, plainly concedes the existence of an
imbalance of the power relations between management and employees.
Conversely, in those cases where arbitrators deem the fairness doctrine
inapplicable as contrary to the expressed will of the parties, for example
Re Metro Toronto Police, it can be argued that arbitrators in effect are
107 A zipper clause is one which asserts that the collective agreement is a full statement of
the parties' intentions on collective bargaining issues. It may therefore restrict the arbitrator's role
quite narrowly. The clause in question was: "17:06 The Arbitrator shall not have any power to
add to, subtract from, alter, modify or amend in any way, any part of this Agreement, nor otherwise
make any decision inconsistent with this Agreement, which expresses the full and complete
understanding of the parties on remuneration, benefits and working conditions." Tbd, at 687.
10s (1983), 149 D.L.R (3d) 53.
109 Palmer, supra, note 84 at 594 is quite pessimistic about the future of the fairness doctrine.
See also Beatty, supra, note 86.
110 Supra, note 106.
"I Weiler, supra, note 71 at 33. For a discussion of the American case law reflecting this
preference, see Feller, supra, note 71 at 689. For a recent discussion of the position in both Canadian
and American law, see Langille, supra, note 94.
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sanctioning this power imbalance by suggesting that employees are freely
and voluntarily submitting to the arbitrary exercise of managerial powers
under the agreement.112 Either interpretation points to the relative absence
of power experienced by employees in their employment relations and
would seem to cast doubt on the "rough equivalence of power" limb
of the Pluralist model and to reveal the limited potency of the fairness
doctrine as presently formulated.,,3
E. Workplace Hierarchy and Employee Subordination
1. The private sector
In view of the limited significance of the fairness doctrine, it should
not be surprising that Canadian collective bargaining policy and practice
expressly recognizes and accepts the notion of workplace hierarchy. In
addition to its role as a form of workplace democracy, the Woods Task
Force appointed by the Canadian Government saw collective bargaining
as a "means of legitimating and making more acceptable the superior-
subordinate nexus inherent in the employer-employee relationship.",,4 For
as Pluralists such as Kahn-Freund have argued, "there can be no
employment relationship without a power to command and a duty to
obey.",,s Moreover, as Kahn-Freund also observed, the role of labour
law is to "attempt to infuse law into a relation of command and
subordination."116 Where then are these relations of subordination to be
found in collective bargaining law and how are they expressed?
They are principally to be found in the "management's rights" clauses
of collective agreements. These clauses vary considerably in length, from
the quite short (for example "all normal prerogatives of management
shall be retained by the Company except as specifically limited or abridged
by the provisions of this agreement"),,7 to very detailed, comprehensive
112 Beatty, supra, note 86 at 153 has cast doubt on such an assumption being made by arbitrators:
It would be misleading and - the question entirely to assert that the standard management's
rights clause reflect a shared understanding that management has (or is desired) the power
to exercise the discretion such a provision delegates to it capriciously, unreasonably and
in any manner which suits its fancy.
113 See supra, note 109.
114 Woods Report, supra, note 56 at 291.
115 0. Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law (London: Stevens, 1972) at 9. Feller, supra, note
71 at 737 expresses similarly the status of managerial relations under a collective bargaining regime:
"Implicit in these rules is the essential characteristic of the industrial agreement: an acceptance
of the authoritarian nature of the employment relationship."
116 Kahn-Freund, supra, note 115 at 8.
117 These examples are taken from F. & E. Elkouri, How Arbitration Works, 3d ed. (Washington:
Bureau of National Affairs, 1973) at 432.
[VOL 24 No. 4
Management-Control Collective Bargaining Relationship
provisions.s It is usual practice in the longer clauses to reserve expressly
for management rights of hiring, suspension, promotion, demotion,
transfer, discharge, and discipline, as well as some broadly defined rights,
for example to "manage the plant and direct the working forces," to
"maintain discipline and efficiency," to "make such operating changes
as are deemed necessary by it for the efficient and economic operation
of the plant," or to determine types of schedule of production, methods
of manufacture et cetera.,19 This last group of broadly defined prerogatives
provides some particularly clear examples of clauses in which strategic
decision making powers are reserved for management. Of course al-
ternatively, and usually additionally, managerial prerogatives often tend
to be contained in single-issue clauses in the collective agreements dealing
for example with promotion, or discipline and dismissal.
In order to ensure that its orders on work matters are obeyed (and
thereby policing its prerogatives), management almost inevitably seeks
to reserve for itself the right to discipline and dismiss, subject often to
a "just cause" requirement.12o Employees who intentionally refuse to obey
management's orders without "just cause" commit the disciplinary offence
of insubordination.,2, Because managerial authority has traditionally relied
upon prompt, unquestioning employee obedience and also because at
common law few exceptions to the employee's obligation to obey were
recognized,22 the Pluralist attitude towards hierarchy and insubordination
is important in understanding the significance collective bargaining has
for management control. In order to examine the Pluralist attitude further,
we may turn to the arbitral jurisprudence on this question.
Generally speaking, it would seem that arbitrators have viewed
employee challenges to managerial authority very seriously. According
to Palmer, "insubordination is the most common type of disciplinary
action found in the field of labour arbitration."23 It is taken seriously
because it "strikes at the basis of managerial functions: the right to control
the workforce."124 Typically, the insubordinate act must be wilful and
designed to subvert managerial authority,125 or in some cases can merely
11 Ibid
19 Ibid at 433.
120 "Just cause" is a restriction upon managerial discretion which tends to appear, when it
appears, in the "Management rights" clause.
121 See the discussion of this employee's offence in Palmer, supra, note 84 at c. 7.
122 See Freedland, supra, note 34.
123 Supra, note 84 at 319. See Re UA.W. & Huron Steel Products Ltd (1968), 18 L.A.C. 220.
124 Ibid at 321.
125 Ibid
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reflect a lack of deference or politeness towards the person issuing the
order.126
The Pluralist protection extended to employees in these situations
is the grievance machinery ending in arbitration. This machinery operates
in an ex post facto fashion. When a conflict arises in the workplace,
the "obey now, grieve later" rule has been deemed to operate: "generally
speaking, it is the duty of an employee when given an order by a superior
which he may think is contrary to the terms of the collective agreement,
to obey the order and then challenge it through the grievance procedure."'27
The justifications offered for this rule accord with the Pluralist values
already established in other areas of collective bargaining law. The
reasoning is essentially pragmatic: "it is essential that the operation -
fundamental to the livelihood of employers and employees - continue
uninterrupted, while the redress to which one or other may be entitled
can be considered and decided in an appropriate fashion."28
The justifications thus echo the "common enterprise," "mutual
survival" claims associated with both the Unitary and Pluralist models.
However, in some arbitration decisions, there is the suggestion of
a less absolute approach by some arbitrators to employee obedience.
In Re Whitaker Cable,29 while it was accepted that an industrial plant
should not become a "debating society," the following approach was
adopted:
the term "insubordination" itself is one which appears to have been borrowed
from military circles and, on that basis alone, is perhaps inappropriate to describe
the relationship that should exist between employees and their supervisory personnel.
We find the term not consistent with the notion of a working partnership between
the employees and management personnel. Where the challenge to authority
undermines the ability to carry out that object which is fundamental to the
partnership, that is, production, the matter may well be viewed seriously. However,
where the sole value that is being protected is the maintenance of authority we
think the rule should be relaxed. 30
Similarly in Re Dallas and the Crown in the Right of Ontario,13, concerning
the discharge of a liquor board employee, the Ontario Crown Employees
Grievance Settlement Board imputed a standard of reasonableness in
assessing whether the discharged employee's act amounted to insubor-
126 Re Liquid Carbonic Canada Ltd & U.S.W, Local 12998 (1975), 9 L.A.C. (2d) 52 at 54.
127 Re Douglas Aircraft Co. of Canada ld and UA.W, Local 1987 (1973), 1 L.A.C. (2d)
109 at 116.
128 Re UAW., Local 673, and De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Ltd (1971), 23 LA.C. 295
at 297-98.
129 (1974), 6 L.A.C. (2d) 109.
130 Ibid at 111.
131 (1981), 28 L.A.C. (2d) 369.
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dination. Moreover the Board noted: "This is not a case of insubordination
but one of disputed facts at a stage when further investigation was possible
and warranted. To allow a supervisor to foreclose a reasonable dispute
of facts by the exercise of some symbolic authority is, frankly,
repugnant."132
It would seem on the basis of these decisions that some arbitrators
will not find insubordination unless the employee's action in some way
derogates from the functional operation of the enterprise. Moreover, there
are well-recognized exceptions to the "obey now, grieve later" rule. A
number of them are merely adoptions of common law exceptions, such
as where the performance of an order threatens the physical safety of
the employee, or requires the employee to engage in illegal acts13 There
even have been suggestions that the scope of these exceptions is growing.34
But at least two aspects of arbitration practice appear to mitigate the
advantages to be derived by employees from these developments. Gener-
ally there must be an objective factual basis, the grievor's fears for his
safety or the illegality of the command, for the operation of these common
law exceptions. An honestly held belief in a state of affairs, which if
true would provide a complete defence, has not been accepted as
sufficient.,35 Furthermore, in contrast to the criminal law burden of proof,
an employee who refuses a proper order is prima facie guilty of
insubordination.136 The employee must then bring himself within one of
the exceptions just enumerated, or be liable for discipline. Both these
arbitration practices would seem to create a presumption strongly
favouring management's position vis-&z-vis its employees, even if it is
true that they ameliorate to some slight degree the almost feudalistic
employment relations tolerated by the common law. While not insig-
nificant in mitigating the plight of individual employees, these devel-
opments appear to do little to alter materially the significance of workplace
hierarchy.37 So long as the requirement of a reasonably held belief of
danger and the presumption of insubordination exist, the continued
subordination of the employee under collective bargaining is indicated.
132 Ibid at 378.
133 See the discussion by arbitrator Arthurs in Re U.A.W., Local 673, Douglas Aircraft Co.
of Canada (1967), 18 L.A.C. 149 at 153.
134 See Palmer, supra, note 84 at 323.
135 Ibid. at 324.
136 Ibid
137 Selznick, supra, note 11 at 167, by no means a Radical, comes to a similar conclusion
on the American arbitral jurisprudence: ".... in general arbitration has given management a relatively
free hand in dealing with insubordination."
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Finally, despite the existence of an "extremely large body of
jurisprudence"138 on the topic of discipline and discharge in the private
sector, there is not sufficient space here to deal with this topic in detail.
It may be observed, however, that while employees' rights have unques-
tionably been extended and formalized by the introduction of grievance
arbitration,,39 management's ability to discipline its employees for in-
subordination and other industrial offences has not been eroded by
arbitration's adoption of quasi-criminal penalties and procedures in
disciplinary matters and, if anything, may have been strengthened.
Arbitration has ritualized and individualized discipline, and subjected it
to a scale of penalties reflecting severity of offence and the existence
of mitigating circumstances.140 While employers have undoubtedly been
confined by having to resort to these procedures and penalty scales,41
the form that these procedures take arguably do serve to analogize the
disciplinary process to the ritual and ceremony of the criminal law, drawing
symbolically on this association to legitimate the overall operation of
collective bargaining, including particularly the acceptability of workplace
hierarchy implicit in the system of discipline provided for by collective
bargaining law. Such a system also offers management the advantages
of a greater range of penalty alternatives and the reduction of uncertainty
in the way discipline is administered.
2. The public sector
In apparent contrast to the private sector, public sector employers
have traditionally exhibited less enthusiasm for collective bargaining with
their employees. Whereas the ideas of unassailable managerial prerog-
atives, justified ideologically by resort to notions of private property,
contract and managerial expertise has lost much of its purchase in the
private sector, it is still frequently argued in the public sector that the
138 Palmer, supra, note 84 at 231.
139 A Pluralist who would seem to adopt this view, while realizing there is still scope for
considerable improvement, is Beatty. See, supra, note 86.
140 Collective agreements usually expressly provide management with powers of discipline
over its workforce, whereas at common law the master was actually obliged to dismiss workers
who were disobedient, there being no legal right in most instances to discipline. See Palmer, supra,
note 84 at c. 7.
141 Ibid It is true that the arbitration jurisprudence now recognizes a remedial arbitral discretion
to order reinstatement whereas previously the aggrieved worker was confined to an order for damages.
Palmer, supra, note 84 at 53. The power to substitute a penalty also arises in some legislation.
See the Ontario Labour Relations Act, supra, note 55, s. 44(9). Moreover, the onus of proof in
disciplinary matters, untypicaUy, is widely acknowledged as being on the employer. Against this
must be offset, however, the fact that it is usually a civi! standard of proof which is applied. Ibid
at 268-70. Such a low burden of proof is unlikely to reassure many employees during times of
high unemployment
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special nature of the public employer and the services it provides to
the community warrant a more restrictive approach to collective bar-
gaining than is provided for in the private sector.42 The public interest
is seen to be distinct from public employees' interests and to assume
a greater significance.,43 Three potential approaches to the subject of
public employee collective bargaining are discernible: (1) absolute re-
jection; (2) a qualified acceptance, with restrictions on the scope of
bargaining, right to strike, grievance procedures; and (3) the unqualified
adoption of the private sector model. A fourth possibility, which appears
not to have been taken seriously anywhere, is for a more liberal bargaining
model than that in the private sector.
Attempts to analyze public sector bargaining in Canada are com-
plicated by the considerable diversity exhibited in federal and provincial
legislation on this topic.4 Most examples, generally speaking, would seem
to fall within the second category mentioned, although a few fall within
the third category. Municipal employees present something of an exception
to this assessment of public employees, for they have tended to enjoy
full bargaining rights since the emergence of collective bargaining in
Canada in the 1940s.145
The traditional arguments used to reject or limit collective bargaining
in the public sector appear now inconsistent both with Canadian con-
stitutional principle and with public sector practice. Many of these
arguments are based on the notion of political sovereignty, the right of
the elected government to act unilaterally or freely in the public interest.
As a doctrine, sovereignty has been roundly attacked in Canada.146 As
142 See Public Service Staff Relations Board Employer-Employee Relations in the Public Service
of Canada: Proposals for Legislative Change (Ottawa: The Board, 1974) (Chairman: J. Finkelman);
H. Wellington &H. Winter, The Unions andthe Cities(Washington: Brookings, 1971); also L Finkelman
& S. Goldenberg, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service" The Federal Experience in Canada
(Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1983) especially at c. 4. Wellington and Winter
adopt a position which is particularly strongly opposed to public sector bargaining.
143 See Wellington & Winter, ibid at 25.
144 See H. Arthurs, Collective Bargaining by Public Employees in Canada Five Models (Ann
Arbor Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, University of Michigan-Wayne State University,
1971) at 1011. Although now rather dated, Arthurs' models reflect the diversity of approaches
still evident in Canada.
145 On the history of collective bargaining in Canada, see A.W. Carrothers, Collective Bargaining
Law in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1965).
146 See in particular SJ. Frankel, "Staff Relations in the Public Service: The Ghost of Sovereignty"
(1958-59) 2 Can. Pub. Admin. 65; also H. Arthurs, "Collective Bargaining in the Public Service
of Canada: Bold Experiment or Act of Folly" (1969) 67 Mich. L. Rev. 971; L Finkelman, "When
Bargaining Fails" in K. Warner, ed., Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: Theory and Practice
(Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 1967) states at 120: "Ideological concepts such as sovereignty
are often no more than political myths functioning to preserve the existing social structure." But
this view has not always held sway in recent times. See Collective Bargaining in the Ontario Government
Service A Report of the Special Advisor, His Hon. Judge Walter Little (May 1969) at 42.
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Finkelman observed over a decade ago in his report on labour relations
in the Canadian public service: "much of the discussion on this score,
couched in terms of principle, is frequently outdistanced by the facts
of life. What was unthinkable yesterday has become the conventional
wisdom of today."47
In other words, the political need for practical solutions to public
employment problems has tended to qualify and erode the relevance
of the sovereignty doctrine in determining the status of public sector
bargaining. As a result, there have not been the extensive debates of
principle on this issue in Canada which fill the American law reviews.48
With the notable and pervasive exception of a right to strike, collective
bargaining has become a widely accepted fact of life in the public sector
in the last two decades.149
Despite a general acceptance in principle, a need to preserve certain
public employer managerial prerogatives from collective bargaining has
nonetheless been widely conceded at the federal and provincial levels
and in the case of certain municipal employees.15o Finkelman has himself
admitted that a line must be drawn because some issues are best left
to the broader political processes. As one might expect, unlike certain
American writers,151 Finkelman's approach to this conceptual issue reflects
a pragmatic orientation:
No matter what extensions are made in the scope of bargaining from time to
time, some subjects will probably remain in which the public interest will be
paramount to any interest that the employees in the Public Service and the
organisation representing them may have in bargaining, where the protection and
furtherance of these interests cannot be left to shared decision-making by the
employer and the employee organisations through bargaining, but must be examined
and established by those who are answerable to the electorate. As one scholarly
observer of the scene put it "one ought never to confuse the wishes of a limited
interest group like a union with those of the entire electorate.... ." Class size
in schools, case load for social workers and doctors, for example, may be legitimate
147 Finkelman, supra, note 142 at 72.
148 For two quite different attacks on public sector bargaining in the U.S., see S. Petro,
"Sovereignty and Compulsory Public Sector Bargaining" (1974) 10 Wake Forest L. Rev. 25; also
C. Summers, Collective Bargaining and Public Benefit Conferra" A Jurisprudential Critique (Ithaca:
Institute of Public Employment, New York State School of Labor and Industrial Relations, Cornell
University, 1976).
'49 As Weiler, supra, note 71 at 217 points out, by 1980 the right to engage in collective
bargaining had actually been exercised by almost 90% of Canadian public sector workers. This
is the highest proportion of any industrial classification in Canada.
15o This is particularly the case in occupations regarded as providing essential services such
as police officers and firefighters. See Weiler, supra, note 71 at c. 7.
151 See Wellington & Winter, supra, note 142. For a more liberal approach to this question,
see C. Summers, "Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective" (1974) 83 Yale L. J. 1156
and "Public Sector Bargaining: Problems of Governmental Decisionmaking" (1975) 44 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 669.
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subjects to the extent to which they are aspects of the work load that employees
are required to perform, but not when demands with regard to these matters are
presented as an aspect of what constitutes good educational policy, or good welfare
policy or good medical policy. The quality of education, of welfare and of medical
care ought to be decided only through the normal legislative process. At times,
it may be very difficult to draw the line between what can be entrusted to collective
bargaining and what must be reserved to be dealt with only through the democratic
process of legislation. But the line has to be drawn nevertheless to stay within
the system as we have it.Ira
Not unlike the private sector, the question of public sector managerial
prerogatives arises most starkly on the issue of the scope of bargaining,
and subsequently on the limits to grievance arbitration. The justifications
for dividing topics for decision making into non-bargainable and bar-
gainable categories vary, but in many respects resemble private sector
concerns with the need to retain managerial flexibility and ensure
operational efficiency.,53 Ideological resort to the sovereignty doctrine
has all but disappeared.54 An argument which has been frequently
reiterated is the view that collective bargaining of public employees
provides them with the means to exert excessive public influence. This
seems to echo the "dangerous weapon" view of collective bargaining
held by the Unitary model but on different grounds. Wellington and Winter,
for example, have argued that the scope of bargaining should not interfere
with the "'normal' American political process.",s5 On their view, public
employee power is enhanced inter alia by the unavoidable proximity of
these employees to public officials which enhances unduly their ability
to influence these officials, and by the reluctance of politicians to confront
taxpayers' wrath concerning the impact of public employee job action.56
For these reasons a Unitary model is urged upon public sector employment
relations.
152 Finkelman, supra, note 142 at 75.
153 These objectives, as were seen, emerged in respect of both the Unitary and Pluralist models
concerning the private sector. Efficiency is a criterion increasingly shared and articulated by public
service managers. As S. Levitan and A. Noden have observed in the U.S., "... policymakers repeatedly
portray collective bargaining rights as the antithesis of efficiency in government, an unacceptable
infringement of essential management prerogatives." See S. Levitan & A. Noden, Working for the
Sovereig: Enployee Reladons in the Federal Government (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,
1983) at 41.
154 But see Petro, supra, note 148.
155 Wellington & Winter, supra, note 142 at 25. This notion, borrowed from the Pluralist
theorist Robert Dahl, has been defined to mean ... one in which there is a high probability that
an active and legitimate group in the population can make itself heard effectively at some crucial
stage in the process of decision." See R. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1956) at 145.
156 Ibid See also A.E. Bent & T.Z. Reeves, Co!/ective Bargaining in the Public Sector Labor
Management Relation and Public Policy (New York. Benjamin Cummings, 1978) at 305.
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The Pluralist response has been that this line of argument has lost
much of its force in light of the economic recession in the 1970s and
taxpayer experience with the public employee job action, wherein the
chaos and anarchy predicted by opponents of public sector bargaining
generally failed to materialize.,s, Others have suggested that public sector
bargaining is even more necessary in order to provide public employees
with sufficient power vis-a-vis public employers and taxpayers on em-
ployment issues.,5" Whatever the validity of these arguments, in Canada
any limited recognition of these arguments has primarily taken the form
of limiting the scope of bargaining in public employment, which has
had the effect of imposing substantial limits upon the collective bargaining
entitlements of public employees.
This has essentially become a legislative task. Section 18 of the
Ontario Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act,,sg for example,
includes a detailed statutory "management's rights" clause, reserving a
wide range of matters for exclusive managerial decision making. More-
over, section 7 of the same Act, which is made expressly subject to section
18(1), specifies a long list of employment issues on which bargaining
may occur.6o The difficulty of line drawing is reflected in the potential
overlap which exists between some provisions.161 However the priority
of public managerial prerogatives on key strategic issues would seem
assured by the subordination of section 7 expressly to the management's
rights in section 18.
Federal collective bargaining legislation, although similar, arguably
represents an even more concerted attempt to protect managerial pre-
rogatives in the public sector. In the federal Public Service Staff Relations
ActI62 (PSSRA), there is a short management's rights clause (s. 7), which
protects the employer's authority to "determine the organisation of the
Public Service and to assign duties and classify positions therein," in
addition to which section 56(2) expressly preserves those conditions of
157 See the discussion on this point in S. Cohen, "Does Public Employee Unionism Diminish
Democracy?" (1979) 32 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 189.
158 See generally Summers, supra, note 151.
159 R.S.O. 1980, c. 108.
160 The list covers traditional working conditions, remuneration, hours, overtime, holidays,
vacations, insurance, et cetera, as well as a rather extensive list of personnel issues, including
promotions, demotions, transfers, lay-offs, reappointments, and, interestingly, the classification andjob evaluation system.
161 For example, while disciplines and dismissals are expressly preserved for management by
s. 18(1)(a) of the Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act, supra, note 159, s. 7 of the same
Act states inter alia, that grievance procedures are bargainable.
162 S.C. 1966-67, c. 72. For an extremely detailed discussion of this Act, see Finkelman &
Goldenberg, supra, note 142.
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employment determined or determinable, under statutes listed in Schedule
ImI to the Act,163 and prohibits the incorporation in agreements of conditions
which require legislative amendment in order to become operative.
Section 70 of the PSSRA regulates bargaining indirectly by limiting
the scope of arbitration:
(3) No arbitral award shall deal with the standards, procedures or processes
governing the appointment, appraisal, promotion, demotion, transfer, lay-off or
release of employees, or with any term or condition of employment of employees
that was not a subject of negotiation between the parties during the period before
arbitration was requested in respect thereof.
This provision effectively precludes a situation whereby all matters made
subject to agreement or which arise during the course of the agreement
may be determined authoritatively by arbitration in cases of dispute. In
other words, arbitrability is not coextensive with bargainability but is
something less. While this has the result that a range of decisions
concerning the organization and direction of the workplace are withdrawn
from employee participation, it also contradicts the "equal partnership"
image of collective bargaining under the Pluralist model in which
collective bargaining is intended to serve as a form of industrial democracy,
by ensuring that any "equal partnership" is confined to very narrow
grounds indeed.
3. Miscellaneous sources of managerial prerogatives
Management control may also derive indirectly from the union in
its intermediary role between managers and employees.16, Here the union's
statutory duty of fair representation towards its members,165 enforced
primarily by labour boards and arbitrators, is obviously relevant in helping
to define the proper union role. Moreover, the manner in which bargaining
units are constituted]66 may weaken or strengthen union power and thereby
influence management's control. Another site of managerial prerogatives
in the public sector legislation arises where interest arbitration machinery
is substituted by legislation in lieu of a right to strike.167 In deciding
which matters are bargainable, interest arbitrators must inevitably resort
163 Ibid, s. 56(2)(b). Thus, for example, the Public Service Employment Act, which appears
in Schedule III, inter alia entrusts appointments, promotion, election standards, lay-off and reap-
pointment to the Public Service Commission. See ss. 8,10, and 34. These matters therefore are
excluded from the scope of bargaining under the PSSRA.
164 That is as "managers of discontent." See the discussion of the union role under the Radical
model.
165 See supra, note 55, s. 68.
166 See supra, note 159, ss. 10, 12.
167 See supra, note 162, s. 101.
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to a particular philosophy or theory of management control in reaching
their decisions on this issue, which will be reflected in the terms of their
awards. The necessity for such a theory is demanded by the "penumbral
uncertainty"168 surrounding the legislative, judicial and arbitral attempts
to spell out those issues which are properly bargainable as a matter of
law and those which are not. As in the case of grievance arbitration,
under the Pluralist model interest arbitrators seem likely to adopt some
version of the "reserved rights" or "joint sovereignty" approaches as
their model.
Where strikes are allowed, these tend to be constrained in ways
unparalleled in the private sector, for example, by notice provisions, limits
upon those employees who can strike,169 so that even here, the prerogatives
of management are rendered more secure than if there existed a right
to strike along private sector lines. While this discussion of the legal
framework for managerial prerogatives has been necessarily brief, it
should by now be clear that the study of law as a form of social control
in the workplace requires attention to a wide variety of potential sources
of managerial power and restraints upon its exercise within the collective
bargaining framework if this question is to be pursued in a satisfactory
manner.
IV. THE RADICAL MODEL
A. A General View
The term "radical" was chosen for the reason that several strands
of thought are subsumed by this term. Grouped together for present
purposes are the Marxist and neo-Marxist writers on industrial relations
(Richard Hyman, Richard Edwards, Harry Braverman), critical labour
lawyers (Karl Klare, James Atleson, Katherine Stone, Duncan Kennedy),
and the "radical pluralists" (Alan Fox, John Goldthorpe). For the purposes
of analysis a relative homogeneity of perspective amongst these writers
may be presumed except where it is appropriate to distinguish between
their contributions and is therefore otherwise indicated.
1. The centrality of "control"
Unlike the Unitary or Pluralist perspectives, this model views the
issue of control as paramount in developing an understanding of industrial
168 By this term is meant the inevitable ambiguity (and therefore scope for alternative
interpretations) arising from any attempt to commit to writing normative principles which are intended
to guide future action.
169 Weiler, supra, note 71 at c. 7.
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relations. Indeed, Hyman has defined the study of industrial relations
to be the study of "the processes of control over work relations."17o Work
relations are seen at least in part to be the product of wider social, political,
and economic circumstances, reflecting a pattern of inequalities which
for Marxists represents a fundamental conflict between the capitalist class
and the labouring class. Fox sums up well the general thrust of this
perspective:
Central to this alternative is the belief that industrial society, while manifestly
on one level a congeries of small special interest groups vying for scarce goods,
status, or influence, is more fundamentally characterised in terms of the overarching
exploitation of one class by another, of the propertyless by the propertied, of the
less by the more powerful. From this view, any talk of "checks and balances"
however apt for describing certain subsidiary phenomena, simply confuses our
understanding of the primary dynamics which shape and move society - as useful
confusion indeed for the major power-holders since it obscures the domination
of society by its ruling strata through institutions and assumptions which operate
to exclude anything approaching a genuine power balance.' 7'
On this view, questions of control and managerial authority need to be
understood in the context of these broader social forces which profoundly
influence and in large measure (at least) are responsible for these relations
of inequality and exploitation in the workplace.
B. Capitalisn, Conflict and the Asymmetry of Power
Because of the exploitative nature of capitalism, relations between
capital and labour are seen as inherently conflicting. While the non-
Marxist Radical might prefer to stress the divergent interests of distinct
groups such as management and employees as the significance of conflict,
the Radical perspective overall differs from Unitary and Pluralist theories
by seeing workplace conflict as inevitable and fundamental.
Capital exploits labour by seeking to obtain labour power at the
lowest price, and then to maximize the returns on each unit of labour
purchased. On the other side, the employee seeks to sell his only asset,
his labour power, for the highest price he can obtain. Work relations
are exploitative because the power distribution between capital and labour
is asymmetrical, whether labour is viewed collectively or individually,
and reflect this fact in the terms and conditions of employment. Whereas
capital can usually choose whether or not to invest, in the absence of
windfall income, labour has no option but to sell its services to employers
on the labour market in return for wages. This power imbalance tends
to be compounded during times of relative unemployment because the
170 R. Hyman, Industrial Relations A Marxist Introduction (London: Macmillan, 1975) at 203.
17' Supra, note 12 at 274.
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competition among prospective employees to sell their labour power
intensifies, allowing capital to obtain its labour on more favourable terms.'"
For the Marxist, the market relationship between capital and labour
is critical in determining the character of relations in the workplace.
The asymmetry of the market relationship contributes substantially to
the subordination of employees to the demands of management (as
capital's agents). As Schienstock explains:
The fact that labour cannot be seen in isolation from the individual providing
it implies that the wageworker, by selling his labour, subjugates himself to the
domination of the capitalist. The fact that the capitalist purchases the commodity
labour affords him the right - as with any other purchased commodity - to
dispose of it at his discretion and therefore use the wage-worker to his own best
interest. He can dictate the working conditions and exercise any type of control
he wishes.173
While a Pluralist would probably contest the specific accuracy of
some of these claims,74 the Radical would adopt the position that, as
an overall picture, it nonetheless remained correct. Schienstock's statement
remains valid from the Radical viewpoint in terms of pointing to the
operation of the basic principle that "he who pays the piper calls the
tune" both in the marketplace and the workplace. The superior economic
power of capital therefore results in a set of circumstances tending to
favour the dictation of the terms of employment by management.
However, as Fox obviously realized,75 the power of capitalists and
managers in practice is subjected to at least nominal checks and balances,
collective bargaining of course being a prime example of such a check
upon the exercise of managerial discretion. The problem confronting the
percipient Radical, and particularly the Marxist, is to explain the per-
sistence of a system of capitalist domination in the workplace in an
era which has seen the installation of collective bargaining and various
other forms of statutory employment regulation which expressly purport
to act as checks upon managerial discretion. How, in other words, is
the consent of employees to a system of workplace exploitation and
subordination maintained? It is at this point that the Radical perspective
must invoke the concepts of ideology and legitimation in order to explain
this apparent contradiction.
172 Schienstock, supra, note 4 at 181.
173 IbId
174 See J. Getman, "Response to K. Stone's 'The Structure of Post-War Labor Relations!"
(1982-83) 11. N.Y.U. Rev. L. Soc. Change 133-35.
175 Supra, note 12 at 274.
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C. A Critique of Pluralist Collective Bargaining
Under the Pluralist perspective, the amount of conflict tolerable was
strictly limited, because this was seen to be a necessary condition for
the achievement of industrial peace and to guarantee continued pro-
ductivity.76 Participation in the collective bargaining system presupposed
that those participating had a normative commitment to the system's
procedural integrity. Beyond this, the Pluralist model recognized as well
at least some substantive issues as being properly the subject of bargaining.
However, as Radical exponent Richard Hyman argues, it is only "legit-
imate interests" which may be subject to negotiation by the parties under
the Pluralist model: "Legitimate interests, it is normally assumed, are
those commonly identified as such by 'responsible' participants in 'mature'
collective bargaining: that is to say, they are interests which can in principle
be accommodated in the give-and-take of bargaining between employers
and union representatives."17 This view of limited legitimate workplace
conflict is of course not inconsistent with the "reserved rights" theory
of managerial prerogatives which was seen to be predominant in Pluralist
labour relations.,78 It is this "limited conflict" interpretation of collective
bargaining which Pluralists view as most likely to serve the long-term
overall interests of society through the preservation of a "modified
capitalistic or mixed enterprise economy.",79
But what are "legitimate interests" for the purposes of collective
bargaining and how are they defined? Moreover, how is employee
participation restricted to these issues only and then reconciled with the
"industrial democracy" rhetoric associated with the Pluralist model? These
are all questions of express concern for the Radical model which shall
be addressed now.
D. "Free and Voluntary" Bargaining and the "Joint Authorship of Rules"
In order to understand these issues, the Radical argues, an examination
of the nature of collective bargaining together with its associated ideologies
is necessary. Most Radicals would argue that the sharing of ideologies
supportive of managerial interests by employees substantially reduces
the problem of control for management. Indeed, many Pluralists would
probably make the same admission. However, for the Radical, the Pluralist
model's apparent advocacy of, and provision for, a rough equivalence
176 See J. Goldthorpe, "Industrial Relations in Great Britain: A Critique of Reformism" in
T. Clarke & L. Clements, eds, Trade Unions Under Capitalism (London: Fontana, 1977) at 203.
177 Hyman, supra, note 68 at 33.
178 See text accompanying note 89.
179 Woods Report, supra, note 56 at 22.
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of bargaining power and the joint authorship of rules is belied by the
reality of an asymmetrical power relationship between management and
employees in which rights of employee participation are extensively
circumscribed. Pluralism nevertheless is seen as able to obtain and sustain
working class support for management policies and directions which
employees through a combination of, or ideological appeals to, broader
cultural values (private property, economic efficiency, managerial ex-
pertise) and through the granting of some real, economic and non-
economic concessions, but only those which do not fundamentally alter
the existing power relations between management and employees.so
"Joint authorship of rules" and "free and voluntary bargaining"
developed as aspects of contractualist doctrine in the nineteenth century.181
However, to the extent that these notions have some real consequences
(that is to say a collective agreement is negotiated on a range of issues
in which there has been ascertainable employee participation and some
concessions are made in response to union demands), they also legitimate
the status quo not only with respect to those issues expressly subject
to bargaining and contained in the collective agreement but also, and
more significantly, the entire panoply of issues pertaining to the organ-
ization and direction of the work process. Katherine Stone notes:
The stress on joint rule determination slides easily into an implicit assumption
of self-determination by labour, that is, by helping to frame the rules, the union
has "made its own bed".... Under industrial pluralism, however, the collective
bargaining agreement is termed a system of government. The notion of government
by consent of the governed implies that each side has accepted not only the particular
terms of the agreement but also the entire network of procedures that surrounds
the creation of the agreement, its enforcement and its renegotiation. The particular
rules that are generated by these processes are thought to express both sides'
participation and both sides' consent to every aspect of the labour-management
relationship. The entire panoply of workplace regulations and decision - dis-
ciplinary rules, methods and pace of production, hiring policies, and product quality
- is implicitly within the union's consent. Thus virtually all management decisions
are legitimated by the theory. 82
While one cannot isolate the study of ideologies from the study
of concrete practices,,83 Stone in effect makes the point that these
18o Ibid
181 See text accompanying notes 30-34.
182 K Stone, "The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law" (1981) 90 Yale L. 1509
at 1574. See also Feller, supra, note 71 at 764.
183 Because employee consent is so fragile and requires ongoing accomplishment, it is not
sufficient, or rather it is dangerous, for management to try and rely purely on such ideological
claims as "joint authorship" and "free and equal bargaining" for the maintenance of employee
consent. If management are to ultimately succeed in controlling the workforce, they must retain
the ability also to threaten and carry out economic and/or coercive sanctions against employees
collectively and individually. This is a point commonly made by power theorists. See, for example,
D. Wrong, Power Its Forms, Bases and Uses (New York: Harper and Row, 1979) at c. 5.
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ideological "positions" on collective bargaining, derived from contract
(and thus widely articulated, understood, and accepted), permeate and
legitimate the outcomes on a whole range of managerial and labour
relations issues, a range far broader and organizationally more significant
than those issues usually encompassed by the collective bargaining notion
of "scope of bargaining." The implication, of course, is that overall
management control is maintained and strengthened at the same time
as collective bargaining is seen to operate, in part through granting various
concessions to employees. The "scope of bargaining" issue still requires
discussion under the Radical model, not only because it is a key aspect
of Pluralist collective bargaining, but also because in acting as a limiting
device on the possibility of unrestricted collective bargaining by the parties
it would seem to require legitimation if employee acceptance of the basic
fairness of collective bargaining is to be sustained.
E. The Scope of "Legitimate" Bargaining
Because the Pluralist model of collective bargaining must be made
to appear credible, the Radical would concede it is necessary for
management to actually make concessions in the process of bargaining
with employees for collective agreements. However, the sacrifices required
by management to secure industrial peace are essentially and by necessity
relatively insignificant: By necessity because if they were not so, then
reality would confirm the descriptive validity of the Pluralist model:
Only the margins of power are needed to cope with marginal adjustments....
What many see as major conflicts in which labour seems often now to have the
advantage are conflicts only on such issues as labour deems it realistic to contest,
and these never touch the real roots of ownership, inequality, hierarchy and privilege.
Only if labour were to challenge an essential prop of the structure would capital
need to bring into play anything approaching its full strength, thus destroying
at once the illusion of a power balance. For example, a demand backed by strike
action that wage earners receive equal rewards with top management would soon
demonstrate which side could, and would, feel impelled to last out longer.184
Thus while the total amount of control in the workplace may be extended,
resulting in tangible increments in the degree of employee participation
on a variety of issues, the essential symmetry of power distribution in
the workplace can be maintained. Significantly, the practice of limited
accommodation of employee interests contributes to an appearance of
fairness and therefore to the overall legitimacy of collective bargaining
as a form of employee participation on a limited range of work issues.
It renders concrete, albeit in limited ways, the ideologies of "free and
184 Supra, note 11 at 279-80.
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voluntary bargaining" and the "joint authorship of rules" which are used
to explain the workplace status quo.
Collective bargaining legitimacy is also encouraged by its economic
bias. From any viewpoint, there can be little doubt that those interests
most readily agreed as being legitimate subjects of bargaining are those
matters pertaining to wages, fringe benefits, and hours. Indeed, because
concessions on these issues have in the past been more readily obtained
it is well-recognized that there is a tendency for dissatisfactions related
to the workplace to be converted or displaced into wage and other similar
demands.18s Because in the past employers have also been able to provide
this type of concession relatively easily in collective bargaining, this form
of employer largess served to reinforce the vision of collective bargaining
as fair while simultaneously preserving more strategically important areas
for decision making exclusively for management.
Because also of the economically inferior position of employees,
the economic orientation of collective bargaining, which produces visible
improvements in response to employee short-term needs, encourages a
perception of bargaining which is, if not expressly opposed to a wide-
ranging form of employee participation in workplace governance, is
pragmatically oriented towards the fulfillment of these short-term, prin-
cipally economic needs. Employer willingness or ability to meet these
needs following a period of bargaining, and possibly a strike or arbitration,
contributes to a "myth of achievement"8s whereby minor improvements
in the position of employees are presented as significant gains.
F. The Trade Union Role in Conflict
Traditionally, the trade union role has been regarded by Radicals
with some ambivalence. Marxists have alternatively viewed unions as
crucibles within which the bases for the overthrow of capitalist forms
of production lie (the "optimistic tradition"s7) or as agents of integration,
oligarchy, or incorporation, ultimately engaged in furthering the interests
185 See Hyman, infira, note 186 at 27-28; K. Klare, "The Public/Private Distinction in Labor
Law" (1982) 130 U. Pan. L. Rev. 1358 at 1401. But as Hyman has also pointed out, "Economic
crisis and recession are in no way an opportune context for the peaceful and orderly accommodation
of opposing interests.... ." As he goes on to say, "In such circumstances, however, 'participation'
(though not control) may be offered to subordinate and disadvantaged groups without diminishing
the dominance and advantage of those at the top." See supra, note 68 at 35.
186 This is ".... an illusion which magnifies fractional changes in wage rates or marginal
improvements in employment conditions into resounding successes." V.L. Allen, Militant Trade
Unionism (London: Merling, 1969) at 30; cited in R. Hyman, Marxism and the Sociology of Trade
Unions (London: Pluto Press, 1971) at 7.
187 Hyman, ibid. at 4.
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and forms of capitalist production ("the pessimistic tradition",-8). In
contrast to the former, the "pessimistic" view casts unions as managerial
agents engaged in the control of the workforce on behalf of capitalist
class interests.
In view of developments in twentieth-century labour relations, the
"pessimistic" tradition has become the orthodoxy. Dahrendorf's "insti-
tutionalization of conflict" thesis9 and Wright Mills' concept of the union
boss as "manager of discontent"'go have portrayed the union role in terms
of its inevitable and at least partial integration into the practices and
procedures of capitalist production. The union role is primarily therefore
counter-confrontational, although not entirely, so for to suppress employee
insurgency completely for managerial ends would endanger the legitimacy
of the unions in the eyes of their workers.191
Thus the union role has been characterized as primarily reactive
rather than active in dealing with changes, and more firmly oriented
towards particular, sectional grievances, especially of individual em-
ployees, than towards the collective predicament of employees.92 In
assuming the role of "junior partners" to traditional management,
collective bargaining law has strongly influenced the union role. According
to Karl Klare, this law has sought".., to place unions in the uncomfortable
position of serving as fiduciaries of an imagined societal interest in
industrial peace and of serving specific managerial and disciplinary
functions.",93
Through a normative or pragmatic engagement in collective bar-
gaining, the union's "junior partnership" in workplace governance ensures
a source of managerial reassurance: ". . . so long as [the unions] maintain
a primary commitment to collective bargaining, they cannot openly attack
the predominant right of the employer to exercise control and initiate
change."94
On this view, collective bargaining is not primarily an alternative
means of employee power (that is the "countervailing power" thesis)
but an adjunct of management control exercised on management's behalf
by the union (that is rather a "co-optation" thesis).
188 Jbid
189 Supra, note 74.
190 C.W. Mills, The New Men of Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1948) at 8-9.
191 Hyman, supra, note 186 at 37.
192 Hyman, supra, note 170 at 97.
193 K. Kare, "Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of Collective Bargaining
Law" (1981) 4 Indus. Ret L. 450 at 452.
194 Hyman, supra, note 170 at 97.
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Union commitment to collective bargaining procedures can be
explained as arising because the availability of concessions and the rights
and privileges of union office are predicated upon an acceptance of these
procedures. Because of their inferior power position, unions have few
options but to pursue short-term, chiefly economic concessions. Moreover
it is a set of circumstances which union officials often find is most
advantageously exploited through collusion with management rather than
by engaging in anything other than symbolic conflict.19s
G. Trade Unions and the Handling of Grievances
From the Radical perspective, the union role in handling work
grievances epitomizes its role in the control and subordination of rank
and file employees. The union serves as a "junior partner" of management,
by systematizing employee compliance with grievance procedures and
encouraging their acceptance of grievance procedures as the primary
means for the resolution of workplace conflict and of the work enterprise
as naturally and inevitably hierarchical.96 These outcomes are seen to
be brought about in the following way. Because collective agreements
usually provide that the handling of individual grievances is to be
controlled by unions on behalf of their members, in such cases the
intervention of unions in the grievance process is guaranteed. While union
power is enhanced by their participation in processing individual griev-
ances, it is at the "price" of co-optation into the collective bargaining
scheme. At the same time it provides management with a means of
ensuring that the lower ranks in the hierarchy are complying with its
policies and directives.,97 Unions participate in what is also an educative
function: "Modem grievance processes, which normally involve successive
appeal steps up the management ladder from foreman to manager to
top management, recognise and reinforce a hierarchical structure.",98
On this view, unions may be seen to constitute an integral part
of the workplace bureaucracy contributing, by their juxtaposition between
management and the workforce, to the instillment of workplace hierarchy
195 See supra, note 186 at 20.
196 See HJ. Glasbeek, "Voluntarism, Liberalism and Grievance Arbitration: Holy Grail, Romance
and Real Life" (Address to the Government and Labour Relations: The Death of Voluntarism
Conference, School of Management, University of Lethbridge, Alberta, 6-8 September 1984)
[unpublished].
197 For example, Feller, supra, note 71 at 766.
198 Atleson, supra, note 91 at 106. As Glasbeek has stated: "The flexibility of remedial powers
given to arbitrators is one of the more significant achievements of trade unions. But, in obtaining
it, they have accepted, in large measure, the role of educator in and administrator of, employer-
imposed work rules." HJ. Glasbeek, "The Utility of Model-Building - Collin's Capitalist Discipline
and Corporatist Law" (1984) 13 Indus. LJ. 133 at 147.
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and the subordination of employees, and to the acceptance of this position
by their members as realistic and inevitable, if not always desirable. In
this role they are assisted by their ostensible function as representatives
of employees' interests and by their "successes" in obtaining concessions
from management.
A managerial bias in the handling of grievances is also reflected
once grievance procedures are exhausted and grievances are referred
to arbitration. Under Canadian labour law, employees are typically
prevented from striking or participating in other forms of work disruption
over any issue during the course of the agreement. Moreover, the union
is usually limited in the issues which it may pursue to arbitration by
the terms of the collective agreement. On the Radical view, the exchange
of the "right" to disrupt work for a restrictive form of grievance arbitration
patently disadvantages the position of employees vis-iz-vis management,
inasmuch as the union's most patent source of power, the collective
withdrawal of labour, is suspended for the period of the agreement. It
represents the "quid pro quo myth" of grievance arbitration, conceded
even by some Pluralists.,99 But Radicals do not regard the union sacrifice
as matched by the availability of arbitration. This arrangement, as with
other aspects of collective bargaining, is also seen as designed to secure
industrial peace rather than the pursuit of substantivejustice for employees.
The prime beneficiaries of this industrial peace are seen to be management.
The role of grievance arbitrators in securing this peace through
defusing conflict is seen as critical. Stone notes:
Arbitrators function in this power contest as active intervenors in plant life in
order to ensure the smooth continuity of operations and the diffusion of tensions,
so as to help to preserve industrial order. But, as with any form of social order,
it is important to see who benefits from industrial orderliness, and at whose expense
it is achieved. It is in disorder that workers experience and exercise their power
in the production process.200
The elimination of workplace disorder is thus viewed as the primary
objective of arbitrators and as necessary for the continued subordination
of employees. In terms of the operating assumptions employed by
arbitrators in deciding upon grievances, while at least formally the
arbitrator conforms to the dictates of the Pluralist model, the Radical
would see his motivations, methods, and objectives as deriving from the
199 See S. Lynd, "Investment Decisions and the Quid Pro Quo Myth" (1978-79) 29 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 396. One Pluralist who admits the mythical proportions of this notion is David
Feller. See Feller, supra, note 71 at 766.
200 Supra, note 182 at 1565.
1986]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Unitary model or a restricted Pluralisto, model, or even more likely in
view of his formal commitment to Pluralism, a combination of the two.
Finally, the Pluralist might ask: What about the arbitral use of "just
cause" requirements and the development of the doctrine of fairness as
constraints upon managerial discretion?202 What also about the concept
of "progressive discipline" and the right of arbitrators to review the
appropriateness of disciplinary penalties? Surely these are blows struck
in the Pluralist tradition? The Radical response echoes the response which
it took towards the concessions to employee demands wrought at the
bargaining table, or made following a strike or binding arbitration. Any
employee gains in terms of discipline for "just cause" are marginal and
do not alter the fundamental primacy of management in governing the
workplace nor the essentially inferior, expendable status of employees.03
For example, in terms of discipline and dismissal, Glasbeek has argued
that little has altered since the nineteenth-century pre-arbitration era and
that while the penalties and procedures have become more measured,
penalties frequently remain as severe if not more so than before.20 While
the employee may retain his job, the effect of the new cool, calculating
arbitral rationality on disciplinary matters is to exact a very efficient
form of control over those who remain employees.o05 As for the arbitral
doctrine of fairness, beyond noting the Pluralist's own ambivalence
concerning the doctrine, its chief significance has been interpreted as
being procedural rather than substantive, and therefore subject to the
same power-redistributing limitations as some of the other collective
bargaining and arbitral procedures already discussed in this section.06
H. Working for the State: the Radical View
While Radical examinations of the role of the state in capitalist
societies are quite numerous,207 little attention apparently has been devoted
to the position of state employees in industrial relations and particularly
to those engaged in collective bargaining with their employers. Public
201 By "restricted Pluralist," it is intended to contrast the "reserved rights" approach with
the "joint sovereignty" approach. See text accompanying note 86.
202 Supra, note 174.
203 Supra, note I I at 279-80.
204 Glasbeek, supra, note 196 at 37.
205 On the rationalization of forms of capitalist discipline over the past two centuries, see
M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Pantheon, 1977).
206 Glasbeek, supra, note 196 at 60.
207 For a fairly comprehensive review of radical theories of the capitalist state, see B. Jessop,
The Capitalist State (New York: N.Y. Univ. Press, 1982). Also E.O. Wright, Class, Crisis and the
State (London: Verso Editions, 1978).
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employees may include highly trained professional persons, clerks, manual
labourers, and any range of other different occupations. Generalization
on their predicament is therefore difficult if not impossible. As in the
case of the Pluralist model, any Radical analysis of their position must
address the essentially triadic public employment relationship, in which
the employee is subject both to the direction of his employer and to
the demands of the public he is employed to serve. He constitutes thus
a "bridge between ruler and ruled."208 This position lies in obvious contrast
to the chiefly diadic relationship between the private sector employer
and his employee, under which the employee owes no special duties
as a result of employment to anyone but his employer.2 9
Earlier, it was seen that Pluralists have recognized the diffuse and
complex management structures encountered in the public sector. The
multilateral and multiparty nature of public sector management is rendered
more complex by a confusing array of statutory obligations upon
managers, towards the public and other agencies, as well as towards
their employees. This state of affairs encouraged a reluctance among
some Pluralists to condone private sector style collective bargaining in
the public sector. Several writers from within the Pluralist tradition,
however, notably Sanford Cohen2lo and Clyde Summers,21, have suggested
that a broad mandate for public sector bargaining may be positively
democratic, because it enables employees to confront the combined
opposition of government officials and taxpayers more equally and
therefore to secure a greater measure of workplace justice. Collective
bargaining can also usefully break the "bureaucratic shield so as to enlarge
the possibilities of general public influence"22 upon public sector insti-
tutions. In other words, it has been seen as a potential means of enhancing
public accountability of the State services. It may be asked whether the
Radical model sees any similar transformation possibilities in public sector
unionism and bargaining for effecting greater employee power and more
democratic public services?
The response to this question obviously will depend upon the
particular Radical view taken of the state, industrial relations, and labour
law itself. The Radical position concerning these institutions in private
208 The concept of civil servants and other white-collar workers constituting a "service class"
is discussed in Dahrendorf, supra, note 10 at 255.
209 Employees of course must comply with the normal tortious duties of care owed by citizens
towards each other.
210 Supra, note 157.
211 Supra, note 151.
212 Cohen, supra, note 157 at 195.
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sector bargaining has tended to be a rather pessimistic one. Generally
speaking, the roles of the state,213 the industrial relations apparatus and
labour law in the management-labour relationship were not portrayed
except as ultimately supportive of traditional forms of managerial
authority. By analogy, one would expect the Radical analysis of the public
sector position to be equally pessimistic, given the fundamentally pro-
capitalist orientation attached to the state and collective labour law under
the Radical model.
A more optimistic, alternative assessment of the predicament of public
sector employees would seem desirable on at least two grounds. First,
the expansion in state services since World War II has meant that the
state has become a major employer, affecting the lives of large numbers
of persons. And secondly, and more importantly, state employees are
uniquely engaged in securing either the conditions for capitalist accu-
mulation or the legitimation of the state and the accumulation process.,4
This has meant that the very conditions of their working experiences
raise inherently political questions about the allocation of state resources.
And, as Johnston has noted, "Public workers are brought face to face
in their work with the problems of society, as reflections of their own
lives."21s Because of their direct exposure to political and social dilemmas,
the ability of public unions and bargaining to respond to these situations
at least to protect employee interests would seem very important.
While the Radical interpretations of private sector bargaining and
trade unionism have taken a pessimistic approach, the foundations for
a more positive Radical approach to collective bargaining by public sector
employees can be found elsewhere. One source stems from the recent
work of some American political economists on the nature of State
employment;26 the other from recent developments in Radical approaches
to bourgeois law, including the critical legal studies movement.217
First, it has been necessary to proceed past the view of the State
as a monolithic structure, implacably opposed to the "real" interests of
213 Although the Radical view of the state vis-a-vis private sector employment was not expressly
considered in this chapter, it was nonetheless clear from the view taken of collective bargaining.
See Hyman, supra, note 170 at c. 5 for one account of the state's role in industrial relations.
214 See M. Hart-Landsberg, J. Lembake and B. Marotto, "Public Sector Workers and the Crisis
of Capitalism" in Crisis Reader Editorial Collective, J. Fox et at, Crisis in the Public Sector A
Reader (New York: Monthly Review Press/Union for Radical Political Economics, 1981) at 240.
215 P. Johnston, "Public Sector Unionism" in supra, note 214 at 216-17.
216 In particular, I am referring to the work of James O'Connor, and the essays contained
in supra, note 214. See also O'Connor, The Corporation and the State (New York: Harper, 1973).
217 Here I am chiefly drawing upon aspects of recent Marxist sociology of law as well as
the American critical legal studies movement.
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its employees and the community.2!s But in recognizing the "contradictory
class location"29 of state employees, who have distinct interests of their
own and direct relationships with the "serviced classes" (the aged, the
infirm, the unemployed, the mentally ill, et cetera), the implications of
these relationships and these interests have not always been pursued.
To return to a concept discussed earlier, the consent of state employees
to state programs and to the forms of administration in state agencies
has not been questioned.
James O'Connor has identified a need for state employees to align
themselves with state dependents to form alliances to resist cutbacks
in welfare expenditure.22o A problem in the past has been a perceived
contradiction of interests between these two groups, preventing such
alliances. State employees therefore require an approach to collective
bargaining and the management of their agencies which recognizes the
interests of both themselves and state dependents, and which contributes
to the greater public accountability of the agencies. While this task is
plainly difficult, as the conditions of economic recession result in fewer
economic concessions to state employees,221 state employees will be
obliged (if they do not choose to do so) to address qualitative issues
on a larger scale than before. And as O'Connor has noted, it is precisely
on these qualitative issues, going to the core of state employees' working
lives and to the state-dependents' everyday existence, that the possibility
of a common identity of interests between these two groups and their
joint engagement in political action is likely.2 On this view, then, one
might predict more forceful use of collective bargaining by state employees
to challenge public sector managerial prerogatives on a range of work
issues, thereby expanding as far as possible the scope of bargaining
between the parties.
218 While this view seems increasingly dated, it still has its adherents. It is clearly stated in
the following remarks by Richard Quinney, the American sociologist of law and crime: "... . the
role of the state in capitalist society is to defend the interests of the ruling class.. ." and "[lI]aws
institutionalize and legitimize the existing property relations.... It is through the legal system then
that the state explicitly and forcefully protects the interests of the capitalist class." R. Quinney,
Criminal Justice in America (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974) at 21-24.
219 E.O. Wright, "Class Boundaries in Advanced Capitalist Societies" (1976) 98 New Left
Review 3. A prime example of a group of state employees who are placed in a contradictory
class location, according to this scheme, are police officers. While they are employed as part of
the state structure to maintain and protect the capitalist mode of production, police officers tend
to be recruited mainly from working class neighbourhoods. On the class location of police officers,
see R. Reiner, The Blue-Coated Worker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
220 Supra, note 216 at 146-48.
221 See supra, note 185.
222 Qualitative issues seem less likely to involve "knee-jerk" opposition from concerned
taxpayers. See supra, note 216 at 148.
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Other strategies advocated have included public employees serving
as sources of information upon the activities of government for the general
public22 and forging alliances between public and private sector unions.224
Again, particularly in the latter instance, this is more easily said than
done, due to the public-private worker separation encouraged by private-
sector workers in their role as taxpayers being called upon to fund
increased public expenditure. Nonetheless, it seems not inconceivable
that employee participation in collective bargaining provides not only
a channel of influence on matters touching state dependents, but also
a source of information on the way the state is managed, and lastly,
unites state employees with private sector employees as a class of
participants in collective bargaining procedures with management, thereby
providing a basis for mutual identity and for employee solidarity. In order
for collective bargaining to operate in this way, trade unions would have
to discard any co-opted, collective practices and redefine this role.225 As
a political strategy, the potential of collective bargaining law requires
further consideration, given the largely negative assessment by Radical
exponents and the reliance upon it indicated implicitly by O'Connor and
others.226
Here the question needs to be asked: Is collective labour law simply
a means for entrenching, largely unaltered and unfettered, traditional
hierarchical forms of management control? Here Radical orthodoxy would
tend to argue in the affirmative.227 However, there are authorities and
arguments which, while themselves requiring perhaps further documen-
tation and proof, do not accept as absolute or accurate the answer given
by the Radical orthodoxy.
There exists in Radical legal theory what might be termed the "radical
rights" perspective. It does not accept the simple dismissive approach
towards Pluralist law and legal institutions, but sees valuable advantages
to be derived in actively participating in the forms and devices of Pluralist
legality. This perspective receives its most famous and perhaps clearest
formulation in the words of social historian E.P. Thompson: "... . there
is a difference between arbitrary power and the rule of law.... To deny
or belittle this.., is to throw away a whole inheritance of struggle about
223 W.D. Yates, "Public Sector Unions and the Labor Movement" in supra, note 214 at 230.
224 Hart-Landsberg et aL, supra, note 214 at 257.
225 Ibid
226 O'Connor, supra, note 216. While collective bargaining is not the only strategy open to
public employees, it is one readily available which offers a wider legitimacy than less formal,
unannounced forms of employee protest.
227 See text, supra, following note 176.
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law, and within the forms of law, whose continuity can never be fractured
without bringing men and women into immediate danger."228
His study of eighteenth-century English criminal law found that
ordinary, otherwise disenfranchised folk were able to successfully employ
the existing legal forms to redress grievances and wrongdoings and was
thus able to conclude that the law was not simply a power resource
of an 6lite class.229
The value of contemporary bourgeois legal rights has also been
recognized by some Radical legal theorists, albeit slightly grudgingly:
".... a right encapsulated in bourgeois legal form is certainly better than
no right at all.23o This approach has also emerged, although far from
unequivocally,231 in the work of the Critical Legal Studies Movement,
and, most relevantly, in their critique of Pluralist collective labour law.
In the following passage, Duncan Kennedy seems to be advocating active
employee engagement in collective bargaining, including resorting to
existing clearly-defined procedural and substantive rights, as a foundation
for more ambitious challenges to the balance of power and division of
labour in the workplace:
the critique of rights as liberal philosophy does not imply that the left should
abandon rights rhetoric as a tool of political organising or legal argument. Embedded
in the rights notion is a liberating accomplishment of our culture: the affirmation
of free human subjectivity against the constraints of group life, along with the
paradoxical countervision of a group life that creates and nurtures individuals
capable of freedom. We need to work at the slow transformation of rights rhetoric,
at dereifying it, rather than simply junking it.232
The indeterminacy ensured by the nature of collective bargaining
law as evidenced in specific outcomes in arbitration decisions, case law,
and collective agreements is important in understanding the production
228 E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters (London: Allen Lane, 1975) at 266.
229 A similar approach is taken by J. Young in "Left Idealisms, Reformism and Beyond: From
New Criminology to Marxism" in B. Fine et at, eds, Capitalism and the Rule of Law (London:
Hutchinson, 1979).
230 S. Picciotto, "The Theory of the State, Class Struggle and the Rule of Law" in Fine et
at, ibid at 172.
231 Stone, supra, note 182, for example, would appear to have little room for this type of
strategy.
232 Kennedy, "Critical Labour Law Theory: A Comment" (1981) 4 Indust. Rel. LJ. 503 at
506. While they have tended not to focus upon the implications of such admissions, the capacity
of union struggle and collective bargaining to effect "good" has been conceded by a few critical
labour lawyers. See for example Klare, supra, note 193 at 468; also Klare, "Judicial Deradicalization
of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modem Legal Consciousness, 1937-41" (1978) 62 Minn.
L. Rev. 265 at 266. For an express adoption of the "rights" approach by a critical labor lawyer,
see M. Dubovsky, "Legal Theory and Workers' Rights: A Historian's Critique" (1981) 4 Ind. Rel.
LJ. 496.
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of employee consent to management control. Therefore, if Pluralist
collective bargaining rights are agreed to be potentially valuable, and
there is scope within the interstices of these rights for conscious employee
activity in the pursuit of non-managerial goals, then the possibility for
an optimistic Radical interpretation of the operation of contemporary
bargaining procedures may be said to be established. The strategies
whereby these opportunities are best maximized will differ and remain
still rather uncertain, and therefore open to debate and experiment. A
necessary preliminary step for making this type of determination, however,
is to establish how these rights have been exercised so far, and what
degree of "success" has been achieved.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In addition to offering a description of the primary characteristics
of three models of industrial relations, this paper has sought to illustrate
their influence upon employment relations, and particularly their sig-
nificance for collective labour law in order to test their descriptive powers
in outlining the management control collective bargaining relationship,
and to identify the distinct normative implications of each model. In
this latter role, they serve as three ideologies of the workplace, which
may be used to persuade others of the validity or invalidity of a particular
set of workplace arrangements. As workplace ideologies, they may
manifest themselves through the statements and actions of the parties
to the management control collective bargaining relationship, including
those third parties (arbitrators, judges) called upon to determine the legal
status of this relationship in a particular context. In this last respect,
they may also be legal ideologies, influencing the approaches taken by
courts and arbitrators in adjudicating on matters in dispute between
management and employees, and may also be contained within the terms
of legislation, case law, and arbitration awards. It is possible to discover
the relative influence each model has had upon legislators, judges, and
arbitrators, by examining the terms and outcomes of their decisions and
legislation, and also the influence exerted upon the parties themselves,
by considering the terms of their collective agreements, and the range
of issues taken by either management or the employees to arbitration
and judicial review. This would allow us to investigate the hypothesized
link between workplace ideologies and employee responses to managerial
authority.
The Unitary model was seen to have a lengthy tradition based on
military and bureaucratic principles. Though it has assumed different
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forms, it has remained a strongly pro-managerial ideology, denying any
significant role for trade unions or collective bargaining in the workplace.
It has acquired a greater role and influence in public sector employment
than it has in the private sector, but has continued to influence individual
and collective labour law in both sectors since its legal emergence prior
to the nineteenth century.
The Unitary influence upon the Pluralist model was made evident
in the recent resurgence of a restrictive Pluralist approach towards
collective bargaining law (for example, in Amoco Fabrics), as part of
which "industrial order" and "profitability" have clearly subordinated
"free bargaining" and the "joint authorship of rules" as the determining
goals of Pluralism, thereby providing for the continued dominance of
traditional forms of management in the workplace on a wide range of
issues. By also espousing the criterion of "limited conflict," Pluralism
also revealed a tension between the industrial democracy rhetoric with
which collective bargaining has been associated in theory and the survival
of a hierarchical style of management characterized by a clear cut
separation between work conception and work execution. This tension
would appear manageable only by the making of concessions to certain
employee demands. While these concessions do not challenge the es-
sentials of the existing management structure, the precise scope of
concessions allowable has been left open by the way the scope of
bargaining is defined, allowing a flexible instrument in the hands of the
arbitrators and judges when called upon to define the nature of the
relationship between collective bargaining and management control in
any given dispute. The way in which this concept is interpreted by them
and by management and employees themselves vitally structures this
relationship, although it was seen that management control is also
potentially affected by other aspects of collective bargaining law, for
example, the composition of bargaining units and the doctrines used by
grievance arbitrators. The values and assumptions of judges, arbitrators,
and legislators concerning the running of the workplace will critically
shape the way in which these concepts and doctrines are interpreted
and applied, and, in turn, their decisions will "feedback" on the decisions
taken by the parties themselves concerning what is possible and desirable
in workplace relations. The apparent ascendancy of a restrictive version
of the Pluralist model in collective bargaining law (the "reserved rights"
approach) places clear limits upon the immediate prospect of any
substantial alteration to the structural location of employees in the
workplace under existing forms of collective bargaining. The Pluralist
approach to the public sector management control collective bargaining
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relationship once again revealed a tendency towards a more restrictive
approach than that taken in the private sector. A broader range of
ideological appeals were used to justify the adoption of this more restrictive
approach, for example, the "public interest." A more open, pronounced
effort to "draw lines" between matters bargainable and those deemed
not suitable for bargaining was found in public sector collective labour
law. This then raises the prospect of a dialectical tension between this
imposition of additional restrictions and the corresponding need for
compensating concessions to public employees. While the need for even
greater concessions to counterbalance these restrictions would seem
apparent, the ability and desire to respond to this need would seem
contradicted by the very existence of the restrictions.
Finally, the Radical model provides a valuable battery of criticisms
with which to examine any management control collective bargaining
relationship ostensibly organized on Pluralist principles. It draws attention
to the limits which Pluralist ideology and Pluralist collective labour law
places upon the possibility of free, open-ended styles of joint and
employee-based management, identifying the potential for trade unions,
arbitrators, and others to serve the interests of management control merely
by complying with Pluralist collective bargaining procedures. In the
discussion of the public sector, an attempt was made to identify the
strands of a Radical approach to the study of the management control
collective bargaining relationship, one which was not confined by the
pessimistic interpretation of Pluralist procedures seen in most Radical
analyses of the private sector. This attempt took more the form of a
hypothetical sketch, but would seem nonetheless valuable as an analytical
proposition in investigating the capacity of Pluralist bargaining procedures,
when actively resorted to by employees, to bring about anything other
than marginal improvements in their working conditions and the con-
ditions of their dependent clienteles. While this possibility was proposed
in the public sector context, its significance should not be seen as confined
exclusively to this sector but also as a suitable hypothesis for micro-
social approaches to empirical investigation in the private sector. A
framework for the evaluation of these "improvements" is provided by
the three models considered in this article.
Each model outlined enables different questions to be asked about
any specific management control collective bargaining relationship.
However, as was noted at the beginning, a number of questions may
also be addressed to each of the three models, seeking to specify the
constituent elements of each model. Table A (next page) allows com-
parison between the three perspectives on the issues identified. It indicates,
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for example, the points of ideological similarity between the Unitary
and Pluralist models, and the marked departure of the Radical model's
perspective on these issues. By arranging the models in this way, it has
been intended to provide a convenient format for their use as descriptive
and evaluative devices in the study of management control and collective
bargaining.
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